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LABOUR UNIONS AND
ANTI-COMBINES POLICY
By CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE*
A.

CONFLICTING THEORIES

1.

Policies and Goals of Competition Legislation

Anti-combines legislation has been thought to have both economic and
socio-political aims. The economic aim of anti-combines legislation is to
assist in maintaining effective competition as a prime stimulus in encouraging
the lowest possible prices for goods and services, the highest degree of quality
possible, the most efficient and rapid introduction of technological improvements, and corresponding reductions in prices as productivity rises. The theory
holds that competition assists these goals through the operation of the law of
market supply and demand. Consumers will purchase from the supplier who
can provide the best product at the lowest price, and consequently all firms
compete with each other for consumer purchasing.
So long as firms compete individually, consumer demand reigns supreme.
Once firms combine to regulate prices, quality, amount of production, and
introduction of technological change, they become able to dictate to consumers rather than vice versa. Anti-combines laws are designed to ensure
free markets by preserving and enforcing competition among a sufficient
number of buyers and sellers of goods and services who have sufficiently equal
power to prevent any of them from controlling prices, supply or quality to the
detriment of consumers.'
Charles Gregory has recognized that competition, however, ultimately
ends in monopoly capitalism:
Competition, of course, is a question-begging term. A state of unlimited competi-

tion in a free enterprise society logically leads to the centralizing of control in
the hands of the strongest, usually through combinations and mergers of formerly
separated units which had carried on independently of each other. Thus, competition carried to its logical extreme, paradoxically results in the antithesis of
competition - or no competition. 2

It is this tendency of competitors to combine that makes anti-combines
legislation necessary.
In discussing the economic goals of anti-combines legislation, the Eco* © Copyright, 1976, Constance Backhouse.
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'Symposium, Labour Union Power and the Public Interest (1960), 35 Notre Dame

Lawyer 591 at 629.
2 Charles Gregory, Labor and the Law (2nd rev. ed. W. W. Norton & Co. Inc.:
New York, 1961) at 203.
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nomic Council of Canada has stated that, in general, a policy that strives to
maintain an adequate degree of competition in the domestic market helps to
maintain a pattern of output more closely related to consumer needs, and "will
tend to harden the economy's muscles and render it better able to meet the
tests of international competition". 3 In the conclusions to its Interim Report
on Competition Policy, the Economic Council stated:
In the first place, we have taken the view that the general set of competition
policy should be one that aims at the achievement of efficient resource use in the
Canadian economy. Second, we believe that some form of social control should
be exerted over all commercial activities, and that over the greater part of the
Canadian economy, efficient resource use will be more readily brought about
through policies that maximize the opportunities for the free play of competitive
market forces. The use of other forms of social control, namely government
regulation and government ownership, should be brought to bear only on those
activities where monopolistic tendencies have all but eliminated competitive
market responses, or where the protection of the consumer interest in matters
such as health, safety, fraud, disclosure, and standardization, 4 among others,
requires the implementation of explicit government regulations.

Thus, anti-combines legislation seeks to keep the free enterprise market
functioning as efficiently as possible, and is a reflection that 6ver, the greater
part of the economy, competitive market forces continue to provide a better
means of organizing economic activities and stimulating dynamic change than
any alternate system.6
The second aim of anti-combines legislation is socio-political. It has been
argued that anti-combines legislation should provide an environment conducive to the preservation of democratic political and social insttutions.6 A.
D. Neale has stated that American distrust of all sources of unchecked power
- as expressed in the theories of 'checks and balances' and of 'separation
of powers' - is a more deep-rooted and persistent motive behind the anticombines policy than any economic belief.7 Large areas of uncontrolled private
power are inconsistent with a democratic, egalitarian society. Further, Kaysen
and Turner have expressed as a persistent American belief the idea that business units are politically irresponsible and, consequently, that large powerful
business units are dangerous. 8 An economy made up of independent, competing business units provides for dispersed economic decision-making and
renders the holders of economic power liable to mutual encroachment.
In fact, it has been maintained that the sbcio-political aims of combines
legislation should override the economic goals where contradictions occur.
3R. M. Davidson, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Government
of Canada, Canadian Competition Policy: Proceedings o1 a Conference held at Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario, January 20-21, 1972 at 66.
4 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Queen's

Printer: Ottawa, July, 1969) at 195.
5Supra, note 3 at 66.
0 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 at 4-5, per Black, J.
7 A. D. Neale, The Anti-trust Laws of the United States of America (Cambridge:
Cambridge U. Press, 1960) at 29-30, 421-24.
s Kaysen & Turner, Anti-trust Policy (Harvard: Harvard U. Press, 1959), at 3-18.
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Justice Learned Hand stated in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America that one of
the purposes of anti-trust statutes is to perpetuate and preserve, for its own
sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units
which can effectively compete with each other. If the economic goal alone
were considered, combines legislation would condone 'good trusts' which
could prove that they had exercised the highest possible ingenuity, had adopted
every possible economy, had anticipated every conceivable improvement, and
had stimulated every possible demand. However, all trusts were condemned
because Congress desired "to put an end to great aggregations of capital
because of the helplessness of the individual before them". This desire was
based on the belief that great industrial consolidations were inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results, because of their indirect social
and moral effect. 9 A system of small producers, each dependent for his success
upon his own skill and character was preferred over a system in which the
great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. Even where
the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets create occasional
higher costs and prices, decentralization was to be preserved.' 0
2.

Policies and Goals of Labour Relations Legislation

Elementary economics texts describe the operation of a competitive
labour market and the results it might be expected to yield. The broad argument is that, given free and informed competition among workers and employers, each worker must be paid the value of his contribution to production.
He cannot be paid more, because the employer could not continue to operate.
He will not be paid less, because the employer would be making abnormal
profits, and some other alert businessman would enter the industry and bid up
the price of labour,. Thus, there is, supposedly, little scope for controversy or
bargaining over the price of labour. However, this is a very simplified and
idealized picture. It assumes many small employers competing for labour, no
collusion among employers or workers and adequate channels of information." In most industries, in modem times, none of these factors exist.

The employment relationship is typically one of inferiority. Symptomatic
of this belief is the deeply-engrained notion that unorganized labour markets
are not competitive and somehow 'load the dice' against the employee. 12
Adam Smith has recognized that labour markets invite collusion among employers to control and depress working conditions.'3 Employer collusion is
very likely to be a large factor creating an imbalance against the worker in
free labour markets, particularly since, in the absence of organization, workers
9 148 F. 2d 416 at 427 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, 1945).
' Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 at 344. See, contra, Robert H. Bork &
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust (1965), 65 Col. Law Rev. 363 at 369-70.
11 Harry Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process (Yale: Yale U. Press, 1968)
at 30.
12 Ralph K. Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Anti-trust Standards to Union Activity (1963), 73 Yale Law J. 14 at 24.
13Id.

at 26.
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have little or no staying 14
power and cannot offer even token resistence to such
employer arrangements.
In our economic system, anti-combines principles are relied upon to
prevent activities that restrain competition in the product market, thereby
allowing competition, not the government, to regulate that part of the system
in its task of apportioning resources among claimants. But in the labour
market, where employers seek a share of the labour resources, free competition
is inadequate to regulate the allocation of these resources. Thus, the concept
of collective bargaining is used to regulate and allocate resources acceptably
in the labour market. Labour union power, based on group solidarity, is
necessary in the labour market
to redress the inequality of position and power
15
of employer and employee.
The existence of a union tends to correct imbalances in the economic
sphere. The imbalance between the economic power of a corporation and a
single worker is normally so great that, absent unions, the government might
well have to step in to equalize any bargaining or contracting between corporate employers and individual employees.' Indeed, W. Wallace Kirkpatrick
has argued that the union's existence is essential to the operation of a free
economic system and is the only alternative to massive governmental intervention and regulation in this sector of the economy.' 7 Kirkpatrick has postulated that anti-trust and collective bargaining concepts serve similar functions
in different markets: "Each permits decisions in the market place to be made
by the parties in the market without continuous governmental interference
and control."' 8
Collective bargaining performs the function of blunting the impact of
the unorganized labour market's imperfections by providing a rough balance
of power. The growth of union power, with wide freedom to strike in the
hands of strong unions was intended to permit wage earners to secure economic self-advancement, industrial justice, and a democratic voice in industrial
decisions affecting them.
3.

Conflicts Between the Theories

Anti-combines legislation prohibits combinations tending to restrain trade
in goods and services. Labour relations legislation encourages combinations
of employees to bargain collectively in the areas of terms and conditions of
employment. Anti-combines legislation attempts to prevent concentration of
economic power. The very existence of labour unions premised upon the need
for acquisition of power to use for their members' benefit. Consequently, interaction between anti-combines and labour relations policies is inevitable.
14d. at 27.
15

Wallace Kirkpatrick, Crossroadsof Anti-trust and Union Power (1965), 34 Geo.

Wash. Law Rev. 288 at 292.
16 Id.at 294.

171d.
18]d. at292.
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If the purpose of anti-combines laws is to maintain free enterprise and
prevent monopolies, then it must be decided to what extent unions are monopolies. In strict economic terms, competition results in a price set by the
market and any single entity which can affect the price of the product it sells
has some degree of monopoly power. If unions cannot at least affect the price
of labour services, they are failing significantly in one of their self-defined
goals, to raise the wages of their members. According to the economic definition then, a union must have a degree of monopoly power to be even minimally
effective.1 9
Although many of the earliest trade unionists espoused Marxist and other
radical political ideologies, the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
ultimately one of the most successful federations of trade unions, separated
itself from politics and radicalism and was made by Samuel Gompers into an
economic organization of wage-earners engaged in the opportunistic business
of collective bargaining. Accepting the capitalistic business system, the AFL
sought within that system to represent one interest group - labour.20
The Christian Labour Association of Canada puts forth this viewpoint
in the following comments:
One of the most outstanding characteristics of the labour movement's struggle
to improve the lot of the workers has been its struggle for higher incomes. Samuel
Gompers' words, 'we want more and more and more', are but an echo of what
labour has stood for during the past 100 years. This cry of Gompers coupled
with the individualistic creeds of Locke, Smith and Spencer have led corporations
and traditional unions down a restricted one-issue path2 that only stresses profits
and wages, the official gods of the industrialized world. 1

With this viewpoint in mind, it is easy to see that whatever conflict there
may be between labour and management is over the division of the spoils
and not their creation.
Of course, there is no competition between employers and employees - in so
far as competition is concerned, their interests are identical. This is, in fact,
the basis of the theory of collaboration between capital and labour - that while
an employer and employee may strive to obtain a larger share of the intake
of the business, they are united in interest as against all those who are in competition with the particular enterprise in which they are both engaged.22

Yet labour policy has always been regarded as a matter of class war and
a struggle for power between competing groups. Legislation has been largely
directed to increasing or decreasing the economic power which one side may
exercise against the other. Labour legislation relies upon a conflict of interest
and a rough balance of power between labour and management to protect the
public from market power created by collective bargaining. However, as was
19 James M. Murray, Anti-trust and Organized Labor: Lessons from the Past and
Thoughts on the Future (1967), N. Dakota Law Rev. 279 at 287.
20
Supra,note 15 at 291.
21 Organ of the Christian Labour Association of Canada, The Guide, Vol. 22,
No. 5, May, 1974 at 5.
22 Louis B. Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: 1 (1939), 39 Col. Law
Rev. 1283 at 1327.
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noted above, reliance upon this conflict of interest to protect the public is
ludicrous since the conflict is non-existent.
The problems inherent in this situation were increased with the formation
and growth of industrial unions. The trade union philosophy, as first expounded by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, had consistently held that a union
could not be effective unless organization was coextensive with the market
and eliminated price competition based on differences in labour standards.23
Ralph K. Winter sets forth a detailed theory to explain why unions attempt to organize along product market lines and the implications of this for
anti-trust violations. His thesis is that collective bargaining based on employee
organization along product lines creates significant anti-competitive incentives
in both labour and management.
[Unions] aim to control the behavior of employers directly by organizing the
employees of particular firms and compelling favourable contract settlements
by strikes and other means. Since unions operate through firms, their bargaining
power and ease with which their goals may be achieved become largely dependent
not only upon the discipline and loyalty of the union membership but also upon
the position of the employer in the product market and the character of that
market itself.2 4

When a union has not gained full control of the labour force in a product
market, the existence of the unorganized sector has a retarding effect on the
union's power to elicit wage increases.25 Since unionized firms' products must
compete with non-union products, Winter argues that any wage increase in
response to union demands, however moderate, would make union-made
goods non-competitive. Under these circumstances, the union has little or no
bargaining power. To prevent this, the union must either organize along
product market lines, or2 exclude,
by one means or another, the non-union
6
product from the market.
The union has a direct interest in the employer's position in the product
market, since this position puts a ceiling on wage goals. The employer "cannot
give what he hasn't got to begin with, regardless of how disciplined or loyal
the union members are". 27 Winter recognizes that a union will inevitably be
interested in increasing the revenue a firm receives, 23 and argues that this is
one reason why unions need to organize the employees of all the employers
within the particular product market. Industry-wide organization encourages
the maximization of labour costs since all the competing employers share in
the greater burden. When each employer knows that all his competitors in the
23
Sidney
2

Webb and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (1902).
4 Supra, note 12 at 18.
25
1In some cases, the opposite phenomenon occurs. Instead of the presence of
unorganized labour retarding union power to effect wage increases, the existence of a
unionized sector can have an uplifting effect on wages in the unorganized sector.
Obviously, which of these effects is predominant depends upon the degree of union
within the product market.
leverage
2
0 Supra, note 12 at 19.
2 Id. at 18.
2
9 Id. at 21.
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product market will grant similar increases in wages and fringe benefits, each
may lose incentive to resist the union's demands, because it will be easier for
all to make the same price increase at the same time.
In fact, once industry-wide organization has been accomplished, unions
can act directly to maximize the revenue of the group through such monopolistic devices as price-fixing. Winter points out that a union is admirably suited
for the policing of an anti-competitive scheme:
It formulates policy, has access to information in the product market as a whole,
and acts in that market. Moreover, the power it can exercise is at once swift,
drastic, and selective. The price-cutter faced with a union determined to restrain
competition does not choose between maintaining price and initiating a price war
but between maintaining price and having serious labour trouble. A union, therefore, by using any one of the many economic weapons available to it, is able
to impose a very direct and effective sanction on any firm which attempts to
disrupt an anti-competitive scheme. 29

Winter also argues that severe product competition will inevitably increase employer resistance to union demands and even unionization itself, so
that it is actually in the union's best interests to discourage competition. If the
employers in the industry have less bargaining power in the product market
than the consumers of the product - a result of greater competition - they
will be less able to pass on higher production costs resulting from union
demands for better labour conditions. Since such costs cannot be passed on,
they will have a direct impact on the profit levels of the firm, and the temptation to resist union demands will increase.
IIn industries into which new firms find entry easy, and in
which small
firms predominate, a union may find it nearly impossible to maintain perfect
organization and discipline among the employees. The continuing flow of
newcomers, with their non-union workers, will force organized firms to fight
harder to resist union demands. If an organized firm is driven out of business,
the union must deal with the needs of its unemployed members and must also
endeavour to organize the employees of any newcomer who may take the old
firm's place. Thus, in most instances, the union would prefer to protect the
first employer and exclude the newcomer.8 0
There is yet another reason why unions are interested in decreasing competition. Studies of wages during the Depression indicate that they fell first in
the most competitive industries, particularly when the consumers of the product had sufficient bargaining power to force price concessions from the sellers.
Where the sellers had greater bargaining power, price declines were slower in
coming, and wages did not fall as quickly.8 ' Unions desire to lessen the impact
of cyclical swings of the economy in order to protect their wage levels in times
of recession by lessening the degree of bargaining power of consumers.
The advantages to unions of industry-wide organization are not dependent
upon bargaining with a single multi-employer unit. When a union has or29 Id.
30 1d. at 21.
3
1 Id. at 20.
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ganized the major firms in the relevant market, labour standards increase
almost
as uniformly as when the bargaining takes place in a single formalized
82
unit.1

With the growth of formalized multi-employer bargaining, different variations have emerged. Bruce F. Kennedy itemizes four different types of multiemployer bargaining: 1) association bargaining, 2) joint bargaining, 3)
form contract bargaining, and 4) pattern bargaining.3 3 Association bargaining consists of a formal employer association negotiating an agreement
with a single union representing all of the employees of the employers. Joint
bargaining consists of a number of employers engaging in common bargaining
negotiations, but not as members of a formal association. Form contract
bargaining occurs when a single union simultaneously presents identical
contract terms to separate employers. Kennedy says this is prevalent in metropolitan areas and in industries composed of a large number of small competing
businesses such as the retail food industry. Pattern bargaining occurs when
a union consecutively presents similar or identical contract terms to separate
employers who independently negotiate through a single-employer unit. This
is prevalent in industries with an oligopolistic structure (e.g., the automobile
industry) in which an agreement struck by a union with a 'key' or 'target'
employer provides the pattern for later agreements with other firms in the
market.
Multi-employer bargaining has the potential of encouraging combination
and monopoly practices. Horizontal business arrangements have always been
suspect under anti-combines laws because of their amenability to agreements
in restraint of trade. Yet labour relations policy recognizes horizontal business
arrangements as legitimate instruments in the collective bargaining process. Multi-employer bargaining requires collective judgments by employers
as to future wage levels. Winter has commented that it is by no means clear
how these can be reached without collective consideration of future prices.
The econc tic analysis of Alfred Marshall 3 4 and Segal"5 helps to clarify
Winter's argument. Initially it is assumed that a union is concerned both with
raising wages and with the employment of its members. The ability of a union
to achieve its objectives depends on the demand for union labour. In general,
the more 'wage inelastic' the demand for union labour, the smaller will be
the loss of employment after a given wage increase, and the greater will be
the union's ability to meet both its goals - to raise wages and to keep its
members employed.
Alfred Marshall suggests that the demand for union labour will be more
inelastic: 1) the more essential the union labour is to production of the final
32

Archibald Cox, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws, A PreliminaryAnalysis (1955),
104 U. Pa. Law Rev. 252 at 276.
33 Bruce F. Kennedy, Labor-Anti-trust: Collective Bargaining and the Competitive
Economy (1968), 20 Stan. Law Rev. 684 at 687.
34Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed., 1920).
85
Segal, The Relation Between Union Wage Impact and Market Structure (1964),
78 Q. J. Econ. 96.
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product, 2) the more inelastic the demand is for the final product, 3) the
smaller the ratio of the cost of union labour is to the total cost of the product,
and 4) the more inelastic is the supply of other factors of production. 0
More recently, Segal has urged that there is a fifth significant variable
influencing the ability of unions to achieve their goals: the "market structure
proposition". He argues that the competitive structure of a product market
sets limits on the ability of unions to achieve their goals. The ability of the
union to increase its members' wages while still keeping them employed is
greater: 1) the smaller the geographic boundaries of the markets in which
the industry's firms compete, 2) the smaller the number and the greater the
output capacity of the firms in the industry, 3) the greater the barriers to new
entry and the greater the capacity for expansion for existing firms, 4) the
greater the product differentiation, 5) the smaller the degree of independence
among the firms in the industry, and 6) the more inelastic the demand for the
final product. In conclusion, Segal postulates that the less competitive the
industry, the greater the ability of unions to achieve their objectives. 7
Richard G. Chrisman describes how and under what circumstances
unions can control the prices of products.38 Labour costs comprise a large
component of the total production costs in most industries, e.g., 30 per cent
manufacturing, 50 per cent or more in the service sectors.3 9 If a union controls
the labour supply in a particular industry, and if the good or service produced
by the industry has no close substitutes and is a necessity of life or an intense
need for most consumers, its power over wages, and hence over prices, will
be very great. 40
Factors increasing the elasticity of demand for the product, such as substitute products, competition from other industries, technological innovations,
and foreign competition all reduce the union's power. Chrisman notes that
organized labour realizes these limitations on its power and attempts to
minimize them:
The union can broaden its net by attempting to organize any other industries
that compete with the one it operates in (steel and aluminum for example), or
by seeking the cooperation of fellow unions in those competing industries. It can
also lobby for tariff protection from the products of competing foreign producers
or offer its aid in the organization of labour in those competing foreign industries.
And of course it can attempt to shut down the rate of innovation in an effort
to prevent technology-induced
reductions in the amount of labour needed and
4
thus in its own power. '

On the other hand, Archibald Cox has pointed out that industry-wide
unionization does not automatically eliminate labour costs from competition. 42
86 Supra, note 34 at 382-87.
8
7 Supra, note 33 at 696.
88
Anti-trust, Price Structures and Labor Union Power in the Oligopoly Industries

(Summer, 1971), 4 Antitrust Law and Econ. Rev. 47.
s9 Id. at49.
40Id.
41 Id. at 52.
42

Supra, note 34 at 278.
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Uniform changes in wage rates do not have a uniform effect on final prices
since different firms have different variations in the ratio of labour costs to
final prices due to differences in the efficiency of the plant, equipment, management and the productivity of labour. "Furthermore, management has shown
amazing skill in reducing the cost of wage 43increases through new machinery,
improved engineering and like economies.
While agreeing with Cox's statements on the differing levels of productivity and the resulting differences in final prices even when based upon uniform labour costs, one must not ignore the trend toward an expansion of the
scope of collective bargaining beyond matters such as wages and hours of
work, and into subjects such as technological change and job protection.
Collective bargaining may have a definite impact on the productivity of a
firm. 44 Labour unions have sometimes sought to prohibit the introduction of
new machines and processes, with a resulting decrease in productivity.45
John Kenneth Galbraith would argue not only that it is possible for
unions to assist in the erosion of competition, but that it is necessary. Galbraith's thesis in The New Industrial State4" is that the large-scale business
organization is necessitated by the elements of modem economic life - machines, sophisticated technology, heavy investment of capital, technicallysophisticated labour, and a great lapse of time between the decision to produce
and the emergence of a saleable product. 47 Within the modem economic
framework, the need for planning, organization and predictability becomes
paramount. The large-scale business organization alone can deploy the requisite capital and mobilize the requisite skills.48 The large firm can plan more
effectively through its ability to accept market uncertainty where it cannot be
eliminated, to eliminate markets on which it would otherwise be excessively
dependent, and to control the markets in which it buys and sells. 4 9 In fact,
Galbraith argues that anti-combines laws are an anachronism.
Galbraith believes that unions can play a positive role in assisting firms
to facilitate their planning. Unions tend to standardize wage costs between
different firms and to ensure that wage changes occur at approximately the
same time - when contract negotiations are entered into. This greatly assists
price setting and maintenance. All firms will have a common signal to adjust
wages, removing any threat to minimum price setting. Further, the period
during which the collective agreement has effect gives the firms time to investigate the level of productivity and what wage increases can be afforded
43

Id.

Derek Bok and John Dunlop, Labor and the American Community (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1970).
413Id. at261.
40
John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1967).
47 Id.at 4.
44

48Id.
40 Id. at 74.
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without prejudice to price stability. When a union bargains for an industrywide membership, the wage increases settled for will be an average of what
all the firms can afford. Gaibraith sees this as an invaluable simplification.60
Based on this analysis of the character of the modem large corporation,
Galbraith has stated that union interests are no longer opposed to those of
their employers:
The first goal of the technostructure is its own security. Profits, provided that
they are above the minimum necessary for security, are secondary to growth.
Labour relations, naturally enough, are conducted in accordance with the goals
of the technostructure.
This means that the technostructure may readily trade profits for protection
against such an undirected event with such an unpredictable outcome as a strike.
Once again, there is the important fact that those who make the decision during
union negotiations do not themselves have to pay.
But no reduction in profits may be required from yielding to the union. Since
the mature firm does not maximize profits, it can maintain income by increasing
its prices. The wage settlement, since it affects all or most firms in the industry,
provides all with a common signal to consider such action. Its effect on growth
will, of course, be considered. But since this will be the same for all firms in the
industry, and since the regulation of aggregate demand keeps the latter at a high
level, price increases will often seem allowable. 5 '

The thesis that anti-combines laws are an anachronism and that largescale organization is necessary leads Galbraith to the conclusion that unions
should be encouraged to aid corporations in long-range planning and, hence,
in the elimination of competition. However, the premise that modem technology keeps the small corporation from being efficient or innovative has been
challenged by others. 52 It would seem that the validity of Galbraith's thesis

should be carefully examined, since it has many implications for the policies
behind anti-combines legislation, and further, for the acceptability of the role
in which unions may act in relation to anti-combines practices.
Aside from the theoretical considerations of the conflict between the
legislative policies of competition and collective bargaining, actual instances
of union involvement in anti-competitive schemes have been discovered.
Winter alleges that there have been many instances of direct or indirect pricefixing by unions:
The photoengravers ....

for instance ....

have had clauses in collective agree-

ments which barred sales by employers at a price less than the cost of production.
[The International Ladies Garment Workers Union] ILGWU contracts provide
that the price paid by the jobber or manufacturer to the contractor be sufficient
to cover the labour costs involved plus a reasonable amount for overhead. In
the construction industry, there have been many instances of union involvement
in price-fixing or bid-rigging schemes. Other union-inspired devices have been
designed to exclude competitors and thereby provide certain employers with

50Id. at 280.
51

Id. at 265.
52 Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen, America, Inc. (New York: Dial Press, 1971).
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sheltered markets. A familiar example is the refusal by unions in the construction
industry to install or work on material not manufactured by members of the local
union.5 3

Archibald Cox has attempted to elaborate upon the kinds and types of
restrictions that unions acting alone or in conjunction with employers can
impose upon competition.5 4 He has divided such actions into three categories.
First, "[U]nions may strike for, and negotiate, contracts fixing compensation,
the length of the workday or workweek and other conditions of employment
whose direct impact is confined to the labour market and which only consequentially affect competition in the product markets in which employers
sell their goods or services." Cox gives as the best example of this, the imposition of a uniform industry-wide wage scale.5 5 Such a scale, he states, eliminates
price competition based upon differences in wage rates, but does not deal
directly with the product market.
Secondly, "[U]nions may impose or negotiate restrictions upon hours,
work schedules, work assignments, and other employment practices so as to
obtain direct benefits for employees in the labour market, but the restriction
may also directly regulate entry into or competitive practices within a product
market." 50 He gives, as an example of this, instances where a union may
restrict the use of new machinery or the letting of sub-contracts in order to
preserve job opportunities, or the restriction of the employers' hours of business in order to eliminate night or weekend work.
Thirdly, unions may impose "direct restrictions upon competition among
employers in the product market, thus benefitting employees indirectly by
63 Supra, note 12 at 22. Another clear example of a collective agreement providing
an employer with a sheltered market in which to sell his product was the instance
where Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers induced the
electrical contractors of New York City not to install electrical equipment manufactured
outside the Local's jurisdiction. Thus, New York manufacturers were enabled to raise
wages and prices unhampered by competition from other areas. The Sheet Metal
Workers and Plumbers have often negotiated similar agreements (see, supra, note 1
at 627).

One union-inspired device designed to lessen competitive pressures was the United

Mine Workers 'willing and able' clause, which allowed the union to withdraw all
labour when it pleased. It was designed to limit production and spread the available

market among the various firms and workers, thereby preventing an 'oversupply' when
demand faltered. (See, supra, note 12 at 20.) This type of device is used in industries
prone to cyclical economic variations, and was also used by the ILGWU to control
jobbers' hiring and assignment of work to contractors, in order to attempt to 'stabilize'
production in bad times. (See id. at 22.)
In the coal industry, the big mines had little to gain from resisting the UMW's
1950 demands for higher wages, since they were tailored to the larger firms' ability to
automate and were a deliberate attempt on the union's part to wipe out the smaller
operators. Strikes may also be used as a device to add stability to the market structure,
when they are timed to coincide with variations in demand for a product so as to keep
prices at a high level.
54Archibald Cox, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea

(1966), 46 BUL Rev. 317 at 317.
65 Id.
60 Id.
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enabling the employers in the sheltered market to increase their gross return".
Cox uses as an example the possibility that a union may interest itself in the
price at which the product is sold, the volume of production, or the limitation
of opportunities to enter the market and allocation of territory.57
Despite this careful break-down into three categories, we still have no
answer to the question of which of these activities fall within the type of concerted restraint of trade intended to be prohibited by competition legislation
and which fall within the scope of labour relations legislation, activities intended by collective bargaining legislation to be encouraged. Winter concludes
that there is no principle upon which to distinguish 'legitimate' collective
bargaining activity from 'illegitimate' monopolization.
Price-fixing may be designed to assure compliance with the terms of a collective
agreement by seeing to it that the employer has sufficient funds to pay the
required wages. Products may be excluded from a local market because they were
manufactured under 'sweatshop' conditions and would, if allowed to compete
freely, destroy even a modest union wage scale. Share the work programs may
spread the available work among all the workers so that none of them have to
bear the whole burden of bad times and marginal employers are not compelled
to attempt to 'break' the union. But each of these schemes may also be designed
to impose a 'monopoly' upon the public. 5 8

Ultimately, Winter despairs of reconciling the policy conflict without
statutory assistance, and declares that the only realistic interim solution to
distinguish 'legitimate' from 'illegitimate' activity is to determine whether
wages and prices are 'too high'. 59
Despite the difficulties of making a rational distinction between legitimate
collective bargaining activities and illegitimate monopoly activities, there are
many who urge that it is necessary to delineate the kinds of union activity
that will be tolerated and the kinds that will be subject to anti-combines
legislation. Under collective bargaining legislation, trade unions have been the
beneficiaries of favourable public policies affording them many privileges and
immunities. It has been stated that the challenge to public policy lies in the
need for measures which will reduce the dangers of excessive power without
injuring weaker labour organizations
or impairing the capacity of any union
60
to fulfill its beneficient functions.
It would seem that a combination in restraint of trade has the same effect
on the consumer whether it is imposed by business, labour unions, or jointly
by both. Businessmen commit such acts in order to increase profits, and society
has decided that in the arena of competing values, greater profits fall behind
the need for free competition. When labour unions commit such actions, they
intend to seek higher wages and stability of employment for their members.
The issue thus becomes whether we place a higher value on the ultimate union
57 Id.at 318.
58

Supra,note 12 at 29.

59 Id.

60
Archibald Cox, The Uses and Abuses of Union Power, Symposium, supra, note
1 at 624.
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aim of benefitting workers than on the need for free competition. Cox has
argued that in the past, when wages were low and unions were weak, the
interest in raising workers' standards may well have been greater. However,
he argues that the passage of time has both increased union power to make
restraints of trade effective and increased workers' living standards so that
the present immunity of labour organizations from anti-combines laws should
be cut down by legislation if practical abuses are shown and if union immunity
can be scaled down without interfering with legitimate organizational and
bargaining tactics or using the judicial process to make labour policy. 1
In summary then, the theoretical policies of anti-combines legislation and
labour relations legislation tend to conflict with each other very dramatically.
Such theoretical conflict has been manifested in actual practical abuses by
unions and employers to the extent that several authors have argued that
trade union immunity from the anti-combines laws should be limited by
legislation.
B.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH

The conflict between anti-combines policies and collective bargaining
policies creates severe problems of statutory interpretation
as well as critical
issues of public policy. Through the Sherman, 2 Clayton,63 NorrisLa Guardia,6
and Wagnere Acts, the American government has espoused the doctrines of
both collective bargaining and free competition. Difficult questions as to the
application of the anti-trust laws to the activities of labour unions and the
accommodation of apparently conflicting policies in the area of restraint of
trade and labour-management relations in these Acts have been presented to
the American courts over the years. Since the American courts have dealt
with the issues involved in considerably more depth than have the courts in
Canada, which has adopted similarly confficting policies, it is helpful to
examine the history of judicial decision-making on this matter in the United
States.
1.

Legislation and Early Case Law
The Sherman Act is the basic statute embodying the principles of com-

61 Supra, note 32 at 272. Bernard Meltzer in Labour Unions, Collective Bargaining
and Anti-Trust Laws (1965), 32 U. Chi. Law Rev. 659 at 675 has also argued that
the traditional ideology of trade unionism emphasized the worker's inequality in relation
to capital, his need for a voice in the fixing of the terms and conditions of his employment, and the role of the union as an offset to combination and monopoly power on the
enterprise side. Such considerations, he argues, could scarcely legitimize the use of union
powers to create monopoly profits for industry by market-rigging, even though such
profits were to be split with labour.
6226 Stat. 209 (1890) as amended 15 U.S.C. (1964).
08 38 Stat. 730.
64 40 Stat. 70.
65 49 Stat. 449.
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petition. This Act was passed in 1890 and provides broad definitions of what
is to be classified as illegal anti-trust conduct:
Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanour ....
Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour ....

The Sherman Act, as originally passed, contained no language expressly
exempting any labour union activities, and controversy soon arose over
whether the Act was applicable to unions. One viewpoint was that Congress
had drafted the Act to apply only to business combinations and not to labour
unions or any of their activities as such, that the Act was "a law to prescribe
the rules governing barter and sale, and not the personal relations of employers
and employees;... and that the Anti-trust laws designed to regulate trading

were unsuitable to regulate employer-employee relations and controversies". 0 6
The contrary viewpoint was that the Act covered all classes of people and all
types of combinations, including unions, if their activities physically interrupted the free flow of trade or tended to create business monopolies, and that
a combination of labourers to obtain an increase in wages was itself a prohibited monopoly. 7
The first case involving labour and the Sherman Act to reach the Supreme
6 A union
Court was the Danbury Hatters' case in 1908, Loewe v. Lawlor.of hat workers was attempting to organize all of the large manufacturers of
felt hats in the United States. It mounted a national secondary boycott on one
recalcitrant employer, Loewe who brought suit against the membership of
the union for treble damages for violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court found the Sherman Act applicable to unions and granted a judgment
for over half a million dollars. Injunctions were used to enforce the Act against
unions. At the same time, employers invoked injunctions to restrain labour
union activities even where no violation of the Sherman Act was charged.
Due to vigorous protests from employee groups, between 1890 and 1914
numerous bills were proposed to curb the use of injunctions and to take labour
unions wholly outside the application of the Sherman Act. 69 Partly in response
to these union complaints, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914. Section
6 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:
...Mhe labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual self-help, and not having capital stock or conducted for
66

Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) at 801-02.
7 Id. at 802.
68208 U.S. 274 (1908).
69
Supra, note 66 at 802-03.
6
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profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof; nor shall such organizations or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws.

Section 20 of the Act also drastically restricted the general power of federal
courts to issue labour injunctions, restricting it to cases "involving or growing
out of a labour dispute over terms or conditions of employment".
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to interpret the Clayton Act as manifesting a Congressional purpose to exempt labour unions completely from the
Sherman Act. In the cases of Duplex Co. v. Deering,70 and Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn.,71 labour unions had engaged in
secondary boycotts. The Supreme Court held that the Clayton Act exempted
labour union activities only insofar as those activities were directed against
the employees' immediate employers, and that controversies over the sale of
goods by other dealers did not constitute "labor disputes" within the meaning
of the Clayton Act.
Organized labour protested against this interpretation and Congress
adopted their viewpoint by passing the Norris-La GuardiaAct in 1932. That
Act greatly broadened the meaning to be attributed to the words "labor dispute", further restricting the use of injunctions in such a dispute, and emphasizing the public importance under modem economic conditions of protecting
the rights of employees to organize into unions and to engage in "concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and
protection". 72 Further expression of this view was found in the Wagner Act,
passed in 1935, which set the framework for collective bargaining in the
American industrial sector.
In summary, then, American legislation embodies the doctrines of both
competition and collective bargaining. The Sherman and Clayton Acts provide
the framework for anti-trust prosecution and the Norris-La Guardia and
Wagner Acts provide the framework for collective bargaining activities. Some
legislative recognition of the conflicting pulls of the two doctrines is found in
s. 6 of the Clayton Act which provides that anti-trust laws should not be
construed to prohibit the existence of labour organizations or to prevent them
from "lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof". In phrasing the
statute in these terms, however, Congress failed to define precisely the scope
of immunity to which unions were entitled in their product market activities,
and thus left to the courts the development of policy on this fundamental issue.
2.

The Product Market -

Labour Market Distinction

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader73 involved a suit for damages resulting from
a violent 'sit-down strike' which not only damaged the plaintiffs plant but
70 254 U.S. 443.

71274 U.S. 37.
72
Supra, note 66 at 805.
73 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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also prevented the shipment of finished hosiery in interstate commerce. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, attempted to formulate and
rationalize the broad principles governing labour-anti-trust litigation. It found
that union activity was not violative of the anti-trust laws unless it intended
"to restrain commercial competition" 7 4 or "was directed at control of the
[product] market". 75 Mr. Justice Stone said:
Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate the
competition from non-union-made goods... an elimination of price competition
based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor
be the kind
organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to
76
of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.

The Court found the Apex strike legal under the anti-trust laws though
three members of the Court dissented. Thus, Apex held that the Sherman Act
did not apply to strikes or other activities of labour unions unless they affected
commercial competition. Strikes might restrict the employer's power to compete in the market, but ".

.

. the mere fact of such restrictions on competition

does not in itself bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation
of the Sherman Act".77 This decision raises the product market-labour market
distinction: union activities directed towards altering the labour market are
exempt, but activities directed towards the product market itself are not. The
decision and its distinction are perhaps best supported by the argument that
unions are interested in levelling off not so much the 'prices' of commodities
produced throughout a given industry, but 'wages' and other 'working standards'. This argument has been put forth by Charles Gregory:
The unions wish to eliminate the differentials existing between union and nonunion wages in all industries in which they are established. In so far as the
competitive price differential between the union-made and non-union-made products of a given industry reflect the wage differential between union and non-union
rates, to that extent the unions are trying to eliminate competition through
restraints involving the control of commodity prices. Aside from this, unions
exhibit no real interest in standardizing the prices of the products in any given
industry, leaving employers relatively unhindered in making the most of competitive factors like efficiency in management, advertising and incentive
plans, as long
78
as union's employees' toes are not stepped on in the process.

However, the scope of collective bargaining has expanded to the extent
that unions negotiate with management over such issues as the methods of
production, technological change, incentive plans, etc. Control over these
issues is no longer left solely to management, and to this extent, the traditional
areas of union concern with the few factors of wages and hours of work have
expanded almost beyond recognition.
Winter has argued that the distinction between product market and labour
market restraints cannot soundly be made in the context of a system of collective bargaining based on employee organization along product lines, because
74 Id. at 497.
71Id.at 506.
76 Id.at 503-04.
77

78

Id. at 503.
Supra, note 2 at 267.
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it misconceives the basis of union power and the relationship of product
competition to collective bargaining:
. . . the imposition of uniform high wage rates may be a purposeful attempt
to drive out small marginal operators, thereby radically changing the nature of
competition in the product market. On the other hand, some of the most direct
intervention by unions in product markets, such as prohibitions on sales at a price
less than labor costs, are most obviously related to control of the labor market,
such as the protection of contractually-established wage rates. 79

Cox has queried whether, when a court was attempting to distinguish
between product markets and labour markets, it would look to the kind of
combination (the purpose, motive or intent) or to the effect on commercial
competition. He believes that both tests are unhelpful:
Motivation is a slippery guide, for a man can always be found to, and in a sense
does, intend any consequence which foreseeably follows from his conduct ....
If proof of an adverse 'effect' on consumers is enough even though the union
confines itself to the labor market, then the act may apply to any strike which
impairs the flow of goods or services essential to the public health or safety of the
national economy. It might also affect bargaining demands which have an impact
0
on price competition or the level of production.8

It might be added that the purpose-and-motive approach depends to a large
extent on judicial notions of the social and economic desirability of unions.
3.

The Self-Interest Test
U.S. v. Hutcheson was the next in a series of landmark American cases.
A carpenters' union had a jurisdictional dispute with a machinists' union over
which of the two should get the work of dismantling certain machinery at the
Anheuser-Busch brewery in St. Louis. The company gave the work to the
machinists' union. Thereupon, the employees belonging to the carpenters'
union went on strike and picketed the plant. In addition, the officials of the
carpenters' union organized a consumer boycott of Anheuser-Busch beer.
The U.S. Supreme Court found that there had been no violation of the
Sherman Act:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and illicit [under s. 20 of the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished in any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means.8 '

In short, union activity in pursuit of economic self-interest was to be

exempt from the anti-trust laws. Gregory has stated that although the language
of this decision is different, it is consistent with the main position taken in
Apex, since this was not an attempt by the carpenters' union to gain control
over the market for a particular brand of beer. It was, rather, an attempt to
compel Anheuser-Busch to give certain work to the carpenters as against the
82
machinists.
79

Supra,note 13 at 42.
80 Supra,note 32 at 263-64.
81312 U.S. 219 at 232 (1941).
82 Supra, note 2 at 277.

Unions and Anti-Combines

19763
4.

Combination with Non-Labour Groups

The Hutcheson decision did leave open one loophole which allows unions
to run afoul of the legislation. Anti-trust laws might still be applied where a
union acted in combination with non-labour groups; the decision suggested
that unions conspiring with employers to control the supply and price of
commodities for their mutual benefit might still be regarded as offenders
under the Act.
Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical
Workers8" seized on this loophole to find a violation of the Sherman Act in
union activities. In this case, Local 3 of the IBEW, having jurisdiction only
over metropolitan New York City, organized the employees of most of the
electrical equipment manufacturers and contractors in the area. Under the
collective agreements entered into, the contractors agreed to buy electrical
equipment only from manufacturers in contractual relations with Local 3, i.e.,
those in New York City, while the manufacturers agreed to sell only to those
area contractors who employed members of Local 3. The union, through the
usual weapons of picketing and boycotts, prevented non-union operations.
Sheltered from competition, the manufacturers were able to raise their prices,
while the contractors, with the union's blessing and participation, could rig
bids. The result was higher wages and shorter hours for Local 3's members,
greater profits for the manufacturers and contractors, exclusion of outsiders,
and monopolisitic prices for the public.
The Supreme Court stated that this combination of businessmen (the
New York electrical manufacturers and contractors) had violated the Sherman
Act unless its conduct was immunized by the participation of the union. The
Court noted that the union was acting in its own self-interest, but held that
unions violate the Sherman Act when they aid non-labour groups to create
business monopolies, 4 and went so far as to state that "the same labor activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon
whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups".8 5
Kirkpatrick attempts to explain the decision by stating that a union's
long-range goal may be the perfectly legitimate one of higher wages for its
members, but if, in seeking this goal, it permits itself to be used to promote
the employer's desire for higher prices, the union is equally responsible under
the anti-trust laws with the employer group. "Absent corruption, everything
a union does is intended to further its own objectives, but if it seeks these
objectives by helping the employer achieve a more secure position in the
market, free from competitive pressures, then the labor exemption is forfeited."8 16 The exemption granted labour was designed to strengthen the
union's ability to bargain with an employer, not to allow the union to act as
83 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
84
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a tool for the employer's actions of seeking a stronger position vis-h-vis his
competitors:
When labor joins a non-labor group in applying the combined power of both to
secure objectives desired by both, the effect is felt in the product market, and
trade in a commodity is restrained. This deprives the public of the protection it
expects from competition, and the public is not compensated for this loss by any
improvement in the collective bargaining process. The public loses its safeguard
against higher prices and lower quality and gets no improved safeguard to assure
a better allocation of resources in the labor market. 87

The requirement for violation of the Sherman Act, according to Allen-

Bradley, is that unions 'combine' with employers. But Winter argues that
there is no class of cases involving such combinations which can be distinguished from the mainstream of union activities in collective bargaining:
The goal of unions is to control the behavior of particular employers, and their
principal functional significance is in terms of those firms. Under those circumstances, unions 'combine with employers' every time there is agreement between
them, or at least when no conflict of interest exists. And if the point is not clear
enough stated in that fashion, ask how unions 'act alone.'88

Archibald Cox also echoes the same doubts:
The difficulty lies in determining what constitutes such combination, for one can
imagine a spectrum of cases ranging from restraints imposed by a union without
employer agreement to price fixing schemes concocted by business firms in which
the union serves merely as a cloak or enforcement agency.89

Winter has even suggested that if employers do not agree among themselves on
the scheme, resist union demands, and acquiesce only under pressure, AllenBradley is inapplicable.90
Murray has argued that Allen-Bradley sets forth merely another test for
trying to distinguish between the product and labour markets, i.e., that when
collusion is present, unions are influencing the product market. He states that
Allen-Bradley held that labour unions remain subject to anti-trust laws if they
collude with management to set prices. In Allen-Bradley, the union's agreement directly affected the price of the product sold, as well as the price of
labour services, and the court implied that unions were in violation of the
anti-trust laws when their demands influenced the price of the product.91 The
relationship between wages and prices has been analyzed in many lengthy
treatises by economists, notably William G. Bowen and John M. Clark. 92
The extent of the interplay between wages and prices is not completely clear,
but prices are undoubtedly influenced by wages. Murray argues that the only
real issue is over the initial direction of causality: do wages determine prices
to a greater extent than prices determine wages?93 The Court in Allen-Bradley
87 Id.

88 Supra,
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did not deal with these questions, but merely concluded that when collusion
exists, unions are affecting the price of goods, while absent collusion between
union and management, unions are only influencing the price of labour services. Murray concludes that the court is much more concerned with the means
rather than the ends of collective bargaining. 94
It has been noted, also, that Allen-Bradley is an attempt to resolve a
problem which naturally occurs when one group is allowed to use economic
power in a way forbidden to another group. The problem is how to prevent
the group permitted to use the power from selling it to the other group 5
In the next major case, U.M.W. v. Pennington,96 the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that the union had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring with
non-labour groups to eliminate small mine operators and leave the coal industry to major coal producers. The allegations made against the union constitute a fascinating illustration of the extent to which unions can tamper with
the competitive elements in an industry.
There were allegations that the union agreed to the termination of employment for thousands of its members because of the mechanization of mines,
that it would not protest the closing down of mines which could not be mechanized, and that it would go along with the understanding that the coal industry would be confined to comparatively few companies, and that the miners
would be drastically reduced in number. (Although this would seem contrary
to employee interests, it was a move intended to stabilize dangerously shaky
financial conditions in the industry). The large coal-producing companies
agreed with the union that they would not protest the demands of the union
with respect to wage increases so long as the companies were able to match
those increases, by increased productivity through mechanization. The 1958
Wage Agreement required all signatory operators to refrain from buying or
marketing non-union coal. The union agreed that it would not make special
agreements with the small operators in the Kentucky and Tennessee region,
which would give consideration to local conditions and the particular coal
seams mined by the operators, but would have a standardized agreement for
all operators. It was alleged that when the thousands of men who were being
driven into unemployment were put out of the industry, they would cease to
participate in the Welfare Fund benefits and that it was planned that the
Fund would remain as a source of benefit only for the employees of those
companies that survived, to their economic gain.
The U.S. Supreme Court had stated in Apex Hosiery that it recognized
that a legitimate aim of any national labour organization was to obtain uniformity of labour standards and that a consequence of such union activity
97
might be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards.
But the Court stated in Penningtonthat there was nothing in the labour policy
94 Id.
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indicating that the union and the employers in one bargaining unit are free to
settle these matters for the entire industry. On the contrary, the duty to bargain
unit by unit led the Court to a quite different conclusion. The union's obligation to its members would seem to be best served if the union retains the
ability to respond to each bargaining situation as individual circumstances
might warrant, without
being strait-jacketed by some prior agreement with
98
favoured employers.
For the salient characteristics of such agreements is that the union surrenders
its freedom of action with respect to its bargaining policy. Prior to the agreement
the union might seek uniform standards in its own self-interest but would be
required to assess in each case the probable costs and gains of a strike or other
collective action to that end and might conclude that the objective of uniform
standards should temporarily give way.99

The opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice White, states three
propositions: first, that a union and employers may conclude a wage agreement for a multi-employer bargaining unit without violating the anti-trust
laws; second, as a matter of its own policy and not by agreement with any
employer, a union may seek the same wages from all employers; third, a union
forfeits its exemption from the anti-trust laws when it agrees with one set of
employers to impose an agreed wage scale upon other bargaining units. The
critical distinction seems to be that while a union alone may pursue industrywide labour standards policies, even though it consciously drives marginal
employers out of business, a union and a group of employers may not join
together to promote industry-wide standards. They must confine themselves
to the established bargaining unit so that each labour-management group,
whether single employer or multi-employer, large or small, shall operate independently, except for such uniformity as the union, acting alone and not
by agreement with any group of employers, is able and chooses to impose. 10 0
Justice White concluded that the anti-trust provisions, rather than labour
interests, should govern where the union bound itself to a group of employers
through collective agreements to force the same bargaining terms upon all
other employers in the product market. It would almost seem as if Pennington
stood for the proposition that the negotiation of a 'most-favoured nation
clause' was not union activity that would be held to be exempt under the
Sherman Act. By "most favoured nation clauses" is meant those devices by
which employers consent to the terms of a collective agreement conditioned
upon union imposition of identical terms on competitors, or those devices by
which the union binds itself contractually to impose such terms on others.
They assure employers that there will be concerted action as to all matters
covered by the collective agreement and lessen the conflict of interest between
labour and management. 0 1 The main thrust of this argument to prohibit 'most
favoured nation clauses' under the Sherman Act is that such agreements not
only run counter to the anit-trust laws but also contravene the labour policy
98 Supra, note 96 at 666.
00 Id. at 668.
100 Id. at 666.
101 See Winter, supra, note 12 at 71.
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of 'open-end' collective bargaining, in that the union is not free to respond
to each bargaining situation as the circumstances might warrant. The Court's
analysis of this combination was that an agreement which bound both parties
to seek to stifle product market competition frustrated both the anti-trust and
labour policies.
It is interesting to examine some of the thoughts expressed by Mr. Justice
Goldberg, speaking in dissent in Pennington. He stated that it was no secret
that the UMW wished the removal from the market of marginal operators
who could not afford high wages, fringe benefits, and good working conditions.
The UMW had articulated this policy since 1933.1D2 But this desire was based
on the protection of the miners, since marginal operators depressed wae
standards and perpetuated undesirable conditions.
Mr. Justice Goldberg rejected as a useless test the distinction between
unions that acted 'unilaterally' and those which acted 'in agreement with
employers':
A union can never achieve substantial benefits for its members through unilateral

action; I should have thought that the unsuccessful history of the Industrial
Workers of the World, which eschewed collective bargaining and espoused a
philosophy of winning benefits by unilateral action, proved this beyond question.
See Dulles', Labor in America, 208-223 (1949); Chaplin, Wobbly (1948) ....
Unions cannot, as the history of the [Industrial Workers of the World] shows,
employers be
successfully retain employee benefits by unilateral action; nor can
103
assured of continuous operation without contractual safeguards.

He stated that history had also shown that labour contracts establishing
more or less standardized wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment in a given industry or given market area were often secured
through either bargaining with multi-employer associations or through bargaining with market dealers that set a 'pattern' for agreements with other
employers. The multi-employer association and the 'pattern-setting' structure
were merely two similar systems used to achieve the identical result of fostering labour peace through the negotiation of uniform labour standards in an
industry. He found it distressing that the Court should make anti-trust liability
for both employers and unions turn on which of the two systems was used,
i.e., wage agreements could be made with multi-employer units but agreements
could not be made to affect employers outside the formal bargaining unit.
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., presented another aspect and a different decision from the Court. The Chicago local of the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters bargained for its members with small independent
butchers as well as larger, automated, self-service chains. It sought from both
a uniform policy that no fresh meat would be sold after six o'clock p.m. This
union policy had a long history dating back to 1919, and had grown from the
union's struggle to reduce the long arduous hours worked by butchers, which
in 1919 were 81 hours per week. It took a long strike in 1920 to achieve the
102 Baratz, The Union and the Coal Industry (1955) at 62-74.
103
See his decision in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676 at 721-22 (1965).
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first limitation on hours, and hard collective bargaining had followed to maintain the policy and further reduce the number of hours worked.
The restraint directly affected the labour market because it involved not
only hours of work and job opportunities, but also directly restricted competition among employers in the product market by limiting the hours during
which they could be open for business. In the background, there appears to
have been the thought that night sales by supermarkets and other large stores
would endanger the jobs of butchers in small, independent establishments.
The Supreme Court held that the restrictive collective agreement (stipulating no night work) did not violate the Sherman Act. It was felt that the
marketing hours restriction was so intimately connected to wages, hours and
working conditions that the union's successful attempt to obtain that provision
in pursuit of its own policy and not in combination with non-labour groups
was within the protection of the national labour policy and therefore exempt
from the Sherman Act. 0 4
The first determination was that the union was acting in pursuit of its
own policies and not by agreement with employers. Second, Mr. Justice White
evidently considered it essential that there be a judicial finding that a restriction upon store hours was in fact necessary to protect the butchers' job opportunities against the intrusion of clerks. Third, although there is some doubt,
Mr. Justice White apparently thought it proper to appraise whether the benefits
of the agreement to the union outweighed the injury produced by the direct
restraint upon the product market.' 05
Mr. Justice Goldberg quoted an earlier opinion in which he said: "[To
believe that labor union interests may not properly extend beyond mere direct
job and wage competition is to ignore not only economic and social realities
so obvious as not to need mention, but also the graphic lessons of American
labor union history."' 0 6 Mr. Justice Goldberg argued that judges should not
undertake to substitute their judgment for that of union leaders on the
question of what was in the union's self-interest.
In Local 24, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver, a union
was permitted to negotiate concerning the price which would be charged for
the rental of owner-driven trucks, as this was found to have a direct and immediate relationship to the wages paid to non-union drivers because the
trucker was, in effect, getting a rebate on the union wage scale by paying the
owner-driver less rental for his truck. The Court held that:
mhe point of the Article is obviously not price fixing but wages. The regulations

embody not the 'remote and indirect approach to the subject of wages' ... but
a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of a
basic wage structure established by the collective bargaining contract.107

104 Id.

105 Id. at 689.
1o6 ld. at 728.
107

358 U.S. 283 at 294 (1959).
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In this case, prices were so directly related to wages that the union had to
control them in order to control wages.
Similarly, in the garment industry, the courts have upheld union control
over contracts between manufacturers and jobbers on the basis that the
manufacturer-jobber contract was the direct and immediate source of wages
for the employees of jobbers. 0 8 Without such union control, the fierce competition in the industry would make it impossible to maintain the union wage
scale.
5.

ConcertedLobbying

The courts have uniformly held that whatever other concerted action
might be in violation of the Sherman Act, concerted lobbying efforts on the
part of union and employer are not. This principle was articulated in Pennington. There, the companies and the union had jointly and successfully approached the Secretary of Labor to obtain the establishment, under the WalshHealey Act, of a minimum wage for employees of contractors selling coal to
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project. Such minimum wages were
to be much higher than in other industries to make it difficult for small companies to compete in the TVA term contract market. This was part of the
overall plan discussed earlier to raise wage levels and drive marginal operators
out of the market. In this case, the Court decided that joint efforts to influence
public officials did not violate the anti-trust laws, even though intended to
and having the result of eliminating competition. The conduct of the union
and the operators did not violate the Act, since the action taken to set a minimum wage for government purchases of coal was the act of a public official
who was not claimed to be a co-conspirator. 10 9
The reasoning behind holding that concerted attempts to influence legislation are not within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act was likely that any
resulting restraint actually arose from government action. And even if such
concerted influencing were done with a predatory intent, as part of a greater
endeavour to bring economic hardships upon competitors, it could be argued
that people may by right seek self-interested legislation, and that the government is in need of the information received from the admittedly biased lobbying conduit.110
C.

THE CANADIAN APPROACH

1.

The HistoricalBackground

Modem trade unionism grew up in England at the end of the eighteenth
century when state regulation of wages, hours and working conditions generally had died and been replaced by a belief in the prevailing economic
1o Greenstein v. National Skirt and Sportswear Assoc., 178 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y.,
1959); California Sportswear and Dress Assoc., 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957).
' 0 9 Supra, note 96 at 671.
110 Labor and Anti-Trust: "So Deceptive and Opaque are the Elements of These
Problems" (1966), Duke Law J. 191.
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doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism."' For hundreds of years following the
Black Death of 1348, the state had endeavoured to control wages and hours
of work through the agency of the judiciary and by special legislation. However, the factory system of enterprise that emerged as part of the industrial
revolution in the eighteenth century centralized production by moving people
from the countryside into the towns to become wage earners. Growing out of
the industrial revolution, the doctrine of laissez-fairepreached that competition
not regulation, should be fostered on every level of economic activity to promote the greatest prosperity. Thus, the earlier controls on economic activity
were abandoned, as economists proclaimed that the best of all possible worlds
was one where the owners of enterprise
were left free to pay as little as they
x2
had to for wages and materials."
In the world of trade, competition often resulted in traders' combining
in order to compete more effectively. In such cases, the combination was
deomed by the courts to be in the legitimate pursuit of self-interest. It was
considered to be simply competition on a broader scale."13 In a sense, traders
were being allowed to move away from pure economic individualist principles
in order to allow them to amalgamate and consolidate their economic power.
This process created what has been referred to as a twentieth century industrial
revolution," 4 as gigantic firms engaged in mass production techniques. Friedmann comments on this process of development:
The Harris Tweed case not only shows more clearly than any previous decision
the elusiveness of the ideal of freedom of trade, it demonstrates also the evolution which economic individualism has undergone in the last fifty years - the
development from an almost pure Benthamism to a position where economic
groups struggle with each other, with authority looking on as an umpire who
attempts to interfere little or to be impartial. 35

To deal with the growing consolidations of economic power, legislation
was enacted (in Canada in 1899, in the United States in 1890) to attempt to
prevent monopoly power from interfering with the private enterprise system.
Thus, industry has gone through three states - prior to the industrial revolution, it was regulated by statute and by the judiciary, during the nineteenth
century all regulation was removed to allow competitive factors complete sway,
and, most recently, regulations are again being enacted to prevent industry
from asserting monopoly power which is interfering with free competition.
It appears that the position of the wage earner has also been affected in
similar fashion, although he appears to be moving through the above-discussed
stages at a significant time lag behind the industrial sector. Initially, the wage
earner was subject to a great deal of regulation from statutes and the judge111 . M. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort (Kingston: Ont.,
Queen's U.: Industrial Relations Centre, 1967) at 2.
112 Alfred W. Carrothers, Collective Bargaining in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths,
1965) at 13.
11 Supra, note 111 at 2.
114 See Gregory, supra, note 2 at 15.
115 W. Friedmann, The HarrisTweed Case and Freedom of Trade (1942), 6 Mod.
Law Rev. 1 at 2.

1976]

Unions and Anti-Combines

made common law. From the fourteenth century in England, the relationship
of master and servant was comprehensively defined by statute. Craft guilds
maintained strict controls over journeymen and apprentices. At times the
criminal law placed ceilings on wages.' 1"
The changes in condition brought about by the industrial revolution
created an unskilled and exploited labour force. Desperate conditions incited
workmen to combine to demonstrate collectively against their exploiters.
Parliament's response to collective action by wage earners was swift and
severe: in 1799, all combinations were penalized, 17 and in 1800, in the
second Combination Act," 8 Parliament specifically declared illegal combinations and agreements that related to wages, hours of work and conditions of
employment.
The legislative policy behind the CombinationActs of 1799 and 1800 has
been described as the unqualified embrace of laissez-faire. Workers were regarded as individual units of labour power to be priced according to the laws
of supply and demand. When workers combined against an employer, they
interfered with those laws. Yet it should be noted that in the second stage of
laissez-faire that industry passed through, companies were not prevented from
combining as this was seen as pursuit of their own legitimate self-interest.
Thus, it seems that the position of trade-unionists was still back in the first
stage of regulation. Collective bargaining eventually passed through to the
second stage, and was determined to be legitimate, by similar reasoning - that
combinations were in the workers' legitimate self-interest. However, this
acceptance of collective bargaining was very slow in coming.
In 1824, the Combination Acts were repealed." 9 However, the repeal
marked a period of industrial unrest, and in 1825, another Combination Act 2 0
was enacted which permitted some measure of collective bargaining but prohibited acts inducing workmen to join a labour organization, or employers
to alter the manner of conducting their business, if those acts amounted to
violence, threats, intimidation, molestation or obstruction. Furthermore,
Parliament and the courts assumed that combinations to affect terms of employment were criminal conspiracies at common law and that they continued
as such except as freed by the Act of 1825.121
The restraint of trade doctrine was also used by the judiciary to suppress
union activities, since by their combination to pursue their economic interests
22
jointly, the courts felt that trade unionists were impeding free intercourse.
116 See Gregory, supra, note 2 at 13.
17 The Combination Act, 39 Geo. 111, c. 81.
118 39 and 40 Geo. Im, c. 106.
119 5 Geo. IV, c. 95.
120 6 Geo. IV, c. 129.
121 Walsby v. Anley (1861), 3 E. & E. 516.
= 0. Kahn-Freund, The Illegality of a Trade Union (1944), 7 Mod. Law Rev.
192; Bernard L. Adell, The Legal Status of Collective Agreements in England, United

States and Canada (Kingston, Ont., Queen's U.: Industrial Relations Centre, 1970)
at 6. See, also, Carrothers, supra, note 112 at 14-17.
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Due to the prevailing attitudes of courts with respect to union activities, trade
unionists directed their efforts to forcing the enactment of statutes which
would grant them exemption from the legal doctrines which had evolved to
protect employers' rights in the face of trade union challenge. In 1871, the
CriminalLaw Amendment Act 123 was passed. It refined the pejorative terms
found in the Combination Act of 1825, and freed from the law of criminal
conspiracy conduct that might amount to restraint of trade. Contemporaneously, the Trade Unions Act' 24 declared that members of a trade union were not
liable to prosecution for criminal conspiracy merely because the purposes of a
trade union were in restraint of trade.
The Canadian Trade Unions Act, 2 5 copying from the English Trade
Union Act, declared that the purposes of a trade union were not unlawful because they were in restraint of trade, as did the Canadian Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 2 6 copied from the English Act of the same name. The latter
is now found in s. 366(2) of the Criminal Code which prohibits violence, intimidation, and coercion but expressly permits peaceful picketing.
The Conspiracyand Protectionof PropertyAct,2 7 enacted by the English
Parliament in 1875, provided further protection from the common law doctrine of criminal conspiracy. In s. 3 it stated:
An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be

done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime.

In 1876, Canada enacted a similar statute, An Act to Amend the Criminal
Law Relating to Violence, Threats and Molestation,28 which had the effect of
reinforcing the Trade Unions Act and the Canadian Criminal Law Amendment Act.
The courts were not happy with the statutory removal of the application
of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy from trade union activities, and attempted to circumvent the legislative enactments through the creation of the
doctrine of tortious civil conspiracy.' 29 This doctrine was enunciated in what
Lords: Mogul Steamship
has become known as the Trilogy of the House of
1
1 1
30
Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co.,' Allen v. Flood, Quinn v. Leathem. 32
The reaction to these decisions, and to the decision in Taff Vale Railway
128 34 &35 Vict., c. 32.
124 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31.
125 (1872), 35 Vict., c. 30.
120 (1872), 35 Vict., c. 31.
127 38 &39 Vict., c. 86.
128 S.C. 1876, c. 37.
129 Supra, note 111 at 104.
-10[1892] A.C. 25 (H.L.).
181 [1898] A.C. 1 (H.L.).
132 [1901] A.C. 495 (H.L.).
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Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, 33 which held that under
the Trade Union Act of 1871, unions were suable in their own names and
accountable in damages for the wrongful conduct of their members, was the
setting up of a royal commission in England. Its report led to the enactment
of the Trade DisputesAct of 1906.13" This Act abolished the doctrine of civil
conspiracy, stating in s. 1 that conspiracy to injure was no longer actionable if
done in contemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute. The Act also legalized
peaceful picketing and relieved unions from liability in tort actions, whether
of a primary or secondary nature, done in relation to trade disputes. Thus, in
England, trade unions passed through to the second stage that industries had
occupied since the early nineteenth century and were considered legitimate
combinations, free to act in the economic market.
In Canada, the sweeping provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906,
were not generally adopted, probably due to the lesser influence wielded by
trade unionists in Canada as compared to England at the beginning of the
twentieth century. However, in 1943 and 1944, Saskatchewan and Ontario
enacted equivalents of s. 1 of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, abolishing the
concept of conspiracy to injure in trade dispute cases. 135 British Columbia did
so in The Trade Unions Act of 1902,186 as limited by The Trade Unions
Act, 1959.137
With the enactment of labour relations statutes, it appears that what the
legislature envisioned was a policy of non-intervention in the bargaining process, beyond guaranteeing its necessary preconditions. The intention of these
laws was to "leave labour free to choose its own legitimate objectives without
judicial evaluation under the 'lawful objectives' branch of conspiracy". 3 8
Despite the fact that Canadian courts have continued to make use of the
series of industrial torts, (see, for example, Fokuhi v. Raymond,1 9 and Newall
v. Barker,'40 ), it has been argued that the labour relations acts are inconsistent
with the traditional notion of individual labour transactions at any level and
encourage labour activity designed to take wages out of competition.' 41 Due
to the continuing activity of the Canadian courts in applying the civil conspiracy doctrines, 14 it may be a debatable point whether trade unions have
advanced to the relatively unfettered second stage of development in Canada.
133 [1901] A.C. 426.
134 6 Edw. VII, c. 47.

135 The Trade Unions Act, S.S. 1944 (Second Sess.), c. 69, s. 20; see, now R.S.S.
1965, c. 287, s. 25. The Collective Bargaining Act, S.O. 1948, c. 4, s. 3. The Rights

of Labour Act, S.O. 1944, c. 54, s. 3(1); see now, R.S.O. 1960, c. 354, s. 3(1).
136 S.B.C. 1902, c. 66.
137 S.B.C. 1959, c. 90, s. 5; see now, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 384, s. 5. See, also, Alfred

W. Carrothers, The British Columbia Trade Unions Act, 1959 (1960), 38 Can. R.
Rev. 295.
138 H. W. Arthurs, Tort Liability for Strikers in Canada:Some Problems of Judicial
Workmanship (1960), 38 Can. B. Rev. 346.

[1949] 4 D.L.R. 145 (Ont. C.A.).
[1950] S.C.R. 385; [1950] 2 D.L.R. 289 (S.C.C.).
1 See Arthurs, supra, note 138 at 401-02.
142 See id. and Christie, supra, note 111.
'39
1.40
41
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The practical realities of labour union power today, however, are reflected in the following statement: "Individualism has given way to corporatism, in both labour and management.' 14 It was seen that problems arose
when individual companies were left free to combine in the second stage of
development. In fact, these problems necessitated anti-combines legislation
and theoretically, a new era of regulation for industry, i.e., the third stage of
development. Allowing trade unionists freedom to combine has led to many
instances of abuse in modem times, where unions have been exerting a direct
impact on the product market in order to lessen competition and raise prices
and wages. There are some who argue that the time has come to examine the
scope of trade union power to influence competition and to restrict it if necessary, i.e., that it is time that trade unions were moved into the third stage of
development.
2.

The Criminal Code and the Combines Investigation ActTrade Union Exemption

The cornerstone of Canada's present combines legislation was laid by
Parliament in 1889 when it passed An Act for the Prevention and Suppression
of Combines in Restraint of Trade,144 which prohibited conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade. The legislation defined as a misdemeanour any
agreement to limit unduly facilities for transporting, producing, storing or
selling any article or to restrain commerce in it, or to enhance unreasonably
its price.1 45 The provisions of the Act of 1889 were transferred in 1892 to the
Criminal Code, as s. 520.146 The offence was changed from a 'misdemeanour'
to an 'indictable offence'. In 1900, an additional subsection was added which
stated that s. 520 would not be construed to apply to combinations of workmen or employees
for their own reasonable protection as such workmen or
47
employees.1
Section 520 of the Code of 1892, as amended in 1899 and 1900, was
carried forward into R.S.C. 1906, c. 146, and into R.S.C. 1927, c. 36, as s.
498 in each case. With minor changes in wording, it was put into the revision
of the Code as s. 411:148
(1) Everyone who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or dealing in any article,
(b) to restrain or injure trade or commerce in relation to any article,
(c) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of
an article, or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof, or
(d) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, transportation or supply of an article, or
in the price of insurance upon persons or property,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
Arthurs, id. at 401.
Stat. Can. 1889, c. 41.
14
5 Id., s. 1.
146 Stat. Can. 1892, c. 29.
147 Stat. Can. 1900, c. 46, s. 520.
148 Stat. Can. 1953-54, c. 51.
143
144
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(2) For the purpose of this section, 'article' means an article or commodity
that may be a subject of trade or commerce.
(3) This section does not apply to combinations of workmen or employees
for their own reasonable protection as workmen or employees.

Despite the apparent immunity granted in s. 411(3), the question remained whether it applied to combinations of workmen or employees who
were not acting for their reasonable protection as such. The whole of s. 411
was removed from the CriminalCode in 1960, but was put into the Combines
Investigation Act as ss. 32(1), 2(a) and 4.149
Further saving provisions for trade unions still exist in the CriminalCode
in ss. 424 and 425. Section 424 reads as follows:
(1) A conspiracy in restraint of trade is an agreement between two or more
persons to do or to procure to be done any unlawful act in restraint of trade.
(2) The purposes of a trade union are not, by reasons only that they are in
restraint of trade, unlawful within the meaning of subsection (1).

Section 424, it should be noted, is concerned with an "unlawful" act in
restraint of trade, whereas s. 424(2) gives relief only to trade union purposes
which are in "restraint of trade". Section 424(2) does not protect a union in
the case of "unlawful" acts in restraint of trade.
Section 425 reads as follows:
(1) No person shall be convicted of the offence of conspiracy by reason only
that he
(a) refuses to work with a workman or for an employer, or
(b) does any act or causes any act to be done for the purpose of a trade
combination, unless such act is an offence expressly punishable by law.
(2) In this section, trade combination means any combination between masters
or workmen and other persons for the purposes of regulating or altering
the relations between masters or workmen, or the conduct of a master or
workman in or in respect of his business, employment or contract of employment or service.

Section 425 (1) gives relief from the offence of conspiracy in cases where
there is only a refusal to work with a workman or for an employer, or where
a person acts on behalf of a trade combination, unless such act is expressly
punishable by law. In s. 425(2), a trade combination is defined. It is to be
observed that in s. 425 (1) protection is not given to trade combinations as
defined in s. 425(2) in the case of an act which is an offence expressly
punishable by law.
Thus, although the Code exempts trade union activity from conspiracy
offences, it seems that the exemption is limited. In s. 424 trade unions are not
protected from prosecution for conspiracy in restraint of trade based upon
"unlawful acts". In s. 425, unions are not exempt expressly from prosecution
for conspiracy in the case of acts which are offences punishable at law.
In 1910, the first Combines Investigation Act was passed. 150 Its purpose
was to attempt to remedy a weakness in the original legislation of failing to
149 Stat. Can. 1960, c. 45.
150 Stat Can. 1910, c. 9.
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provide investigative machinery for inquiring into alleged combines offences." 5
The Combines Investigation Act of 1923152 provided that nothing in the Act
would be construed to apply to combinations of workmen or employees for
their own reasonable protection as such workmen or employees. This provision was carried forward in succeeding enactments,153 and appears in the
present s. 4. This labour exemption is an exact duplicate of the exemption
that was found in s. 411 of the CriminalCode. In fact, acting upon the recommendations of the McQuarrie Commission, that the CriminalCode provisions
relating to combines be brought into the Combines Investigation Act, Parliament transferred s. 411 of the Code to the 1960 amendments of the Combines
Investigation Act.'5 4
The context of s. 4 is remarkably similar to the corresponding labour
exemption in the Clayton Act that nothing in the American anti-trust laws is
to be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labour organizations
"from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof". Due to the
similarity in the legislative provisions, Canadian courts might be guided in
the difficult tasks of interpretation by American jurisprudence.
3.

Interpretationof the Legislation

It was left to the courts and to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to determine to what extent trade union activities could be prosecuted
under the Combines InvestigationAct and the provisions of the CriminalCode
dealing with conspiracy in restraint of trade, i.e., the extent to which the
sections allowing some measure of exemption for trade union activities and
the exemption of services gave trade unions immunity. The series of court
cases and reports of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (RTPC)
will be discussed in historical sequence.
R. v. Singer 55 involved a combine of manufacturers, jobbers and master
plumbers to set prices and quotas in the area of plumbing contracts. Initially,
an organization called the Canadian Plumbing and Heating Guild was formed,
with a membership including manufacturers and jobbers of plumbing supplies
and master plumbers. Fearing that such an organization would be illegal, the
151 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Queen's
Printer: Ottawa, July, 1969) at 52.
152 R.S.C. 1923, c. 9.
158 R.S.C. 1927, c. 26; Stat. Can. 1935, c. 54; Stat. Can. 1937, c. 230; 1946, c. 44;
1949 (2nd sess.) c. 12; 1951 (2nd sess.) c. 30; 1952, c. 39; 1960, c. 45; 1960-61, c. 42;
1962-63, c. 4; 1964-65, c. 35; 1966-67, c. 23; 1967-68, c. 16.
154 Stat. Can. 1960, c. 45. An additional labour exemption is found in the
Combines Investigation Act, providing that nothing in the Act, or s. 411 of the Code
(when it was still contained in the Code) should be construed to apply to any contract,
agreement, or arrangement between fishermen or associations of fishermen in British
Columbia, and persons or associations of persons engaged in the buying or processing
of fish in British Columbia, relating to the prices, remuneration or other conditions
under which fish could be caught and supplied to such persons by fishermen. (Stat. Can.
1959, c. 40; 1960, c. 45; 1960-61, c. 42; 1962-63, c. 4; 1964-65, c. 35; 1966-67, c. 23.
See, also, H. W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor:A Study of the Legal Problems
of Countervailing Power (1965), 16 U. of T. L. J.89.).
156 [1931] O.R. 202 (H.C.).
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members split the organization into two, leaving the master plumbers in the
Guild, and forming an organization called the Dominion Chamber of Credits
Ltd., for the manufacturers and jobbers. These two groups, however, continued to remain in close contact and cooperation with each other. The master
plumbers then set up an employers' association, the Amalgamated Builders
Council, and made membership in the employers' association conditional upon
membership in the Guild and vice versa. The three organizations were formed
and operated for the express purpose of controlling the plumbing and heating
industry.
When discussing the employers' association, the court refers to it as a
'trade union'. While modem collective bargaining legislation and contemporary usage identify a trade union as an organization of employees, the older
usage implied no such restrictive identification, and included an employers'
association. The definition found in the Trade Unions Act reads "... . such

combination, whether temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations
between workmen and masters, or for imposing restrictions on the conduct
of any trade or business, as would, but for this Act, have been deemed to be
an unlawful combination by reason of one or more of its purposes being in
restraint of trade". 156 In this case, the Council is being referred to as a trade
union in this older usage of the word.
The court stated that had the trade union confined its operations to those
authorized by the Trade Unions Act, objection could have been taken. However, from its operations it was clearly evident that the purpose of those responsible for the creation and operation of the Council was to avail themselves
of any immunity provided by the Act and if possible, to evade the provisions
of the Combines InvestigationAct and the CriminalCode.
The court stated that s. 4 of the Combines Investigation Act clearly
applied to combinations of workmen and employees only and the accused
were certainly not in that class. Regarding the Criminal Code charges of conspiracy under s. 498,157 the court discussed s. 497 (now s. 424), the section
stating that the purposes of a trade union are not unlawful simply because
they are in restraint of trade:
It is quite evident that it was never intended by Parliament that s. 497 should
operate as a complete defence to charges of all the offences created by s. 498 of
the Code. As already stated, it is not the purposes of the trade union that are
attacked in these proceedings, but the acts and operations of some of the members
which are entirely outside the ambit of a trade union, and in this view s. 497

cannot avail as a defence.15 8

The convictions were affirmed on appeal to the Appellate Division of the
court, where the court stated:
The organization and registration by the accused of the Amalgamated Builders
Council as a trade union was an attempt to cloak the operations of the Canadian
Plumbing and Heating Guild under the protection of section 497 of the Code.
156 R.S.C. 1952, c. 267, s. 2.
157 Later s. 411 and finally removed from the Code to the Combines Investigation
Act, s. 32(1).
158 Supra, note 155 at 218.
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What was in appearance a real trade union and registration under the Trade
Unions Act, distinct from the guild, was in fact a mere sham .... 159

In Amalgamated Builders Council v. Herman, the issue arose again when
the trade union was suing for libel and slander over statements that had
charged tyrannous and oppressive action on the part of officers of the union.
The Court of Appeal stated:
• . . it is very doubtful whether the immunity created by the Criminal Code
applies to the undue enhancing of the price of commodities. This is something
far beyond that which is validated - agreements which would have been unlawful 'merely because in restraint of trade'. 160

The next case of interest is "Bread and other Bakery Products in the
Winnipeg area, Manitoba", a report of the Commissioner empowered to investigate under the Combines InvestigationAct, made in July, 1952. Although
the findings of the Commissioner have no precedent value, and there was no
prosecution launched pursuant to the report since the trade union undertook
not to commit the offence again, the analysis was interesting. According to
the report, a trade union, which had entered into collective agreements with
bakeries in Winnipeg, regarded retail prices for bread in retail outlets, which
were lower than the retail prices for bread in the home-delivery market, as
having an adverse effect upon home-delivery sales and, therefore, upon the
income of drivers of bread wagons who were under the collective agreement.
The union instructed its driver members not to make bread deliveries to retail
outlets which had reduced their retail prices in stores below the prevailing
retail prices in house-to-house sales. These instructions were acted upon. The
Commissioner was of the opinion that, although the primary motives of the
union were related to wages rather than to prices, the arrangements were
nevertheless prohibited in s. 411 of the Code (now s. 32(1) of the Act). In
addition, he considered that they fell outside of the protection afforded by
former s. 411 (3) of the Code, now s. 4 of the Act. The Commissioner seemed
to feel that although the primary motives were related to wages and not to
prices as such, the arrangement was designed to have the effect of enhancing
the price of the commodity. This appears to be analysis along the lines of the
product market - labour market distinction. The Commissioner also seemed
to feel some concern that if such arrangements were allowed, it would create a
new means for avoidance of the Combines Investigation Act.',"
159 [1937] O.R. 694 at 703.
160 65 O.L.R. 296 at 302 (C.A.).
181 Interestingly enough, very similar union activity was considered in the American
case Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F. 2d 46 (8th Circuit, 1958), and
the court found the activity to be legitimate. The Adams Dairy Company had developed
a new means of packaging milk which enabled it to be sold through retail stores at
prices substantially below what the local drivers charged for home delivery. To counteract the significant competitive advantages made by Adams, the union revised its wage
scale for commissions for dairy drivers in a way which drastically increased Adams'
wage costs without affecting the cost of the other companies in the market. Since the
means employed by the union, e.g., wage bargaining, were within the scope of a NorrisLa Guardia labour dispute, this action of forcing up prices and thereby eliminating
competition was held to be within the area of exempt activities. It could be argued that
Adans is different from Winnipeg Bread because in Winnipeg Bread the drivers did
not negotiate via collective bargaining for new wage scales but rather refused to deliver
to the stores, thus actually imposing a boycott upon them. How a Canadian court would
deal with Winnipeg Bread, or cases like it, however, remains to be seen.
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The next instance of an anti-combines case involving a trade union was
reported in the RTPC Report, dated May 1, 1959, concerning the distribution
and sale of electrical construction materials and equipment in Ontario. A
union and an electrical contractors' association had negotiated a collective
agreement which provided that no member of the union would be permitted
to work at electrical construction work for anyone who was not a party to the
collective agreement. Nor would members of the union install material or
equipment unless it was supplied by such a party. There had been instances
in which the agreement had had the effect of forcing general contractors, who
were not 'recognized' by the accused association, either to refrain from bidding on a contract or to sublet the electrical work to a 'recognized' electrical
contractor. The Commission recommended that the collective agreement be
amended in a manner that would prevent its being used to further the purpose
of the combination or to restrict entry into the electrical contracting business.
The prosecution following the report of the Commissioner is reported in
R. v. Electrical Contractors Assoc. of Ontario and Dent.162 While the trade
union was not prosecuted, the court made some observations on the effect of
the collective agreement. It had placed firms that were not members of the
association at a great trade disadvantage because no member of the union
was permitted to install their material or equipment. It would appear from
the comments made by the court that, while no charge had been made against
the union and therefore no conviction was registered against it, the union was
a party to transactions which gave rise to convictions of others. 163 The American case of Allen-Bradley can be compared since in that case it was the trade
union's combination with a business group that led to a finding of a violation
under the Sherman Act.
The RTPC Report No. 11, concerning the manufacture, distribution,
supply and sale of belts, issued in 1960, illustrates the impact that the possibility of unionization can have on the formation of a trade association. Although no union was actually involved in this instance, potential unionization
had a very direct impact on the formation of an organization that later used
its powers to restrict competition. The Report states that the possibility that
the workers in the belt industry might be organized as a labour union seemed
to have been largely responsible for the formation of the Belt Manufacturers
Association of Montreal. Apparently the belt manufacturers felt that the
formation of an association would put them in a better bargaining position if
a labour union were established. The statement made by Mr. Abe Officer, of
Deluxe Belts, to the Commission shows clearly the union's role:
Well, I was invited up to the hotel one night. I do not remember by whom or
why, but when I arrived there I saw Mr. Chaine of the I.L.G.W.U., and he laid
down a proposition whereby it would be to our mutual benefit - that is, the Belt
Manufacturers' Association - if we formed an association and then agreed to
unionize our employees as a whole and he pointed out to us that the whole thing
of becoming unionized would only increase the cost of belts, the manufacturing
cost, a cent or two each. At that time the belt business was in terrible condition.
The competition was keen; there was no bottom to the lowness of prices that
[1961] O.R. 265; 24 D.L.R. (2d) 193 (C.A.).
163 A. C. Crysler, Restraint of Trade and Labour (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967)
at 296.
162
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the belts were offered for ....
I thought it was a wonderful idea of they could
get all the belt people together, unionize them, put a ceiling on the amount of
hours the manufacturers would work with their employees, and consequently
I felt that the belt business would be on a more stable basis.

The initiating role of the union officer in this situation did not provide
the basis for further investigation because unionization did not materialize and
consequently the original purpose of the Association was soon relegated to the
background. Thus the trade union was not involved in the Combines Investigation Act prosecution, but if unionization had taken place, it is possible that
further attention should have been paid to the union's activities.
In 1961, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Seafarers' InternationalUnion
of North America (CanadianDistrict) v. Stern, made some comments which,
although obiter, had some bearing on trade union immunity from prosecution
for conspiracy in restraint of trade. In this case, a hotel had refused to rent
rooms to members of the Seafarers' International. The union forbade members
to patronize the services of this hotel, on pain of discipline. One member was
caught breaking the union rule, and was fined and suspended. The Supreme
Court of Canada reinstated the employee and awarded damages. Fauteux, I.,
addressed himself to the problem of trade union immunity from competition
legislation and conspiracy actions:
The criminal law has been amended to grant immunity to trade unions from
prosecution for agreements in restraint of trade. This is a qualified immunity
which flows from a policy designed to promote legitimate endeavours of the
working classes. It does not follow that this special immunity will operate in
cases of combinations absolutely foreign to such endeavours and of which the end
or the means are unlawful.' 64

It appears that the court was forming some sort of distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate endeavours of a trade union. What the contours of
these two categories are is not discussed further. All we can really state with
assurance from this case is that to enforce a boycott of a hotel for refusing
to serve members of the union is not a legitimate endeavour. Perhaps this
activity is far enough removed from bargaining for better terms and conditions
of employment in matters of wages, hours and other benefits, that the court
perceived it as outside the scope of normal union activities.
The RTPC Report No. 30, in the matter of the sale and distribution of
milk in the Ottawa area, released in 1964, involved an investigation of a price
war in the sale of milk that took place during November, 1961. During this
week, the Producers Dairy Co. Ltd. and Borden Co. Ltd. offered their milk
products at unreasonably low rates in the chain stores. One effect of the price
war was to force a sharp decline in income for the home delivery truck salesmen as people took advantage of the chain store milk bargains. The average
pay at that time for a driver was $96 or $97 a week. During the price war,
drivers' pay cheques dropped to the minimum salary guaranteed by the company, $70 weekly. Although the price war allowed the public to obtain milk at
substantially reduced prices, investigation showed that its actual purpose was
to force small producers out of business.
104 [1961] 29 D.L.R. (2d) at 34.
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The trade union involvement in this case occurred as follows. The drivers
and delivery men of Producers and Borden were members of Local 647, Milk
Drivers and Dairy Employees and Allied Workers of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. The plant workers were represented by Local 440,
Retail and Wholesale and Department Store Union. On Friday, November 17,
George Barron, business agent for Local 440's plant workers, and Stewart
Powers, President of Local 647's drivers contacted the President of Producers
Dairy Co. to advise him that the union membership was concerned with and
opposed to the price war. The company undertook to protect the take-home
pay of the delivery men who were members of the union by allowing them the
same weekly payment as they had received the preceding week or the week
preceding that one, whichever was the higher amount. The company initially
understood this to be acceptable to the union.
At a meeting of all the milk distributors on November 18, the Producers
Dairy Co. indicated that it intended to continue the price war and to broaden
it to include the retail trade. The company was then under the impression that
the union members would accept the protection agreement. When officers of
Local 647 appeared at the meeting, they advised the milk distributors that the
union was not satisfied with this arrangement and that the membership might
go out on a wild-cat strike on Monday morning. Producers then agreed to end
the price war, and, effective November 20, there was an automatic return to
previously current prices.
Allegations were made against the Producers Dairy Co. and the Borden
Co. Ltd. that they had engaged in a policy of selling milk at prices unreasonably low and had substantially lessened competition, and against several
officers and members of Local 647 that they had conspired, combined, agreed
or arranged with Producers and Borden to prevent or lessen unduly competition in the sale and supply of milk in the Ottawa area.
The Commission found Producers to be guilty of the offences described,
but found that Borden had participated solely as a defence and self-protection
device. Regarding the allegations against the union, the Commission stated:
The union had requested protection of drivers' take-home pay not only during
the week of November 13, 1961, but for the sake of future security, for the full
period of the price war and the time during which its effects on sales would be
felt. Later this provision was considered inadequate by members of the union.
Only the end of the price war could ensure pay and job security. In the circumstances, the pressure by the union on Producers and Borden to end the price war
is quite understandable and is not considered by the Commission as being related
to prices or to any lessening of competition.' 65

It is difficult to see how the Commission can distinguish this case from
the Winnipeg Bread case. In both cases, certain business practices of suppliers
and distributors were affecting drivers' take-home pay adversely. In Winnipeg
Bread, the union actually did strike and refused to supply retail stores with
bread. In this case, the union threatened to walk out and stop all supplies. In
both cases, the motives of the union were essentially based on the issue of
165 RTPC Report No. 30 at 2.
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wages, but their actions were intended to have an effect on the product market.
The only distinction that might be made is that in this case the Commission
found evidence to indicate that before the price war normal price competition
existed. Therefore, the purpose of the agreement to end the price war was not
to set a fixed or definite price for milk, but to return to the normal competitive
price system. The union acted to force an end to the price war. The union was
acting effectively in the product market but its effect was to produce competition, rather than to eliminate it. This distinction may serve to explain the
different results in the two cases. However, the question remains whether the
same union action to end bona fide price cuts would be illegal.
The RTPC Report No. 36, in the matter of an inquiry into the production, purchase, sale, and supply of plumbing, heating and air conditioning
equipment and related products in Metropolitan Toronto and elsewhere in the
province of Ontario, released in 1965, investigated restrictive trade practices
that occurred in connection with a tender sent out from the Executive Committee of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, on October 23, 1962,
for a contract involving construction and discharge headers and rehabilitation
work at the John Street Pumping Station.
Dynamic Construction and Pressure Concrete Services were the joint
low bidders for the contract. In order to obtain the contract, Dynamic was
required to have its contract approved by the Fair Wage Officer, who would
obtain proof that the contractor would maintain fair wages and working conditions, conforming to Metropolitan Toronto by-laws. In this case, before
clearing Dynamic, the Fair Wage Officer, as a practical means of ensuring
that Dynamic would live up to the Fair Wage Schedule and Regulations, made
his approval conditional upon Dynamic's obtaining a union agreement.
Once Dynamic committed itself to using union labour, it began to encounter difficulties which would not have arisen if it had been able to rely on
the services of non-union tradesmen who were easily available at the time.
The Commissioner of Works, who had been asked to investigate Dynamic on
behalf of the Executive Committee, thought that Dynamic might have difficulty
obtaining the services of plumbers from Local 46 of the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the
U.S. and Canada, and the award of the contract was made conditional on
Dynamic's satisfactory resolution of its labour problems by December 4, 1962.
The Commissioner's concern was based upon the collective agreement
then in force between the Toronto Labour Bureau and Local 46 of the
plumbers' union. This agreement included a provision, in clause 7(C), that
union members would only work for signatory employers, that non-members
of the employer group constituting the Bureau who wished to employ union
labour should sign and be subject to the agreement, and that the requests of
such employers wishing to sign an agreement should be submitted to a Joint
Conference Board for consideration and approval. The Joint Conference
Board was made up of five persons from each of the two parties to the labour
agreement and its decisions were made by majority vote, each side being entitled to three votes.
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The Commissioner of Works felt that Dynamic might encounter some
difficulty in getting approval from the Joint Conference Board because some of
the contractor members had publicly expressed strong opposition to the
awarding of the contract to Dynamic. The Commissioner learned that the
contractors intended to oppose the acceptance of Dynamic on this project
unless Dynamic would nominate Canadian Mechanical Trades (1957) Ltd.
as their mechanical sub-contractor, at the additional cost to Metropolitan
Toronto of $45,909.00. Dynamic refused the proposal that the mechanical
work be done by Canadian Mechanical Trades, the second lowest bidder,
because their anticipated profit margin was concentrated in their mechanical
tender. Since the employer representatives and the union representatives were
each entitled to three votes, it would have been impossible for Dynamic to
become eligible for union labour against the united opposition of the other
contracting firms unless it had the full support of the union, resulting in a
deadlock before the Joint Conference Board, and unless an arbitrator subsequently appointed were to find in favour of Dynamic.
When the Dynamic application came before the Joint Conference Board,
it was seen to be deficient because the licence numbers of a master plumber
and a master heat installer were missing. The Joint Conference Board members
unanimously voted to defer the Dynamic application until the next meeting,
pending completion of the form. They took immediate action to bring the
deficiency in the application to the attention of Dynamic, but when Dynamic
found that the next regular meeting would be after its December 4 deadline,
it did not proceed further, being discouraged by the apparent collusion between
the trade union and the contractors, and lost the tender.
In the statement of evidence by the Director of Investigation and Research, it was alleged that clause 7 (C) of the labour agreement constituted an
agreement between labour and management capable of being used to prevent
or lessen unduly competition, contrary to s. 32(1) of the Combines Investigation Act. However, the Commission determined that there was no agreement
between Local 46 and the contractor members of the Joint Conference Board
to impede Dynamic's application for a labour agreement with a view to preventing the firm from carrying out the John Street contract. It was a common
practice of the Board to defer applications that were doubtful or deficient in
some way. It was not known whether the Joint Conference Board would have
called a special meeting in time to meet the December 4 deadline, because
Dynamic did not pursue the matter.
The Commission determined that the labour members on the Joint Conference Board acted independently in voting on the Dynamic application.
(Apparently the union was reluctant to provide Dynamic with labour because
of its poor record in dealings with labour on past projects.) The Commission
decided that technically there was a possibility that an application by a contractor for an agreement with Local 46 might be declined if the employer
representatives cast their votes against approval of the agreement, contrary to
the wishes of the union, and this was confirmed by an umpire. However, the
Commission stated that from the inception of the agreement in 1957 until
November, 1962, the contractor members had been guided by the wishes of
union officials in regard to applications for labour agreements with Local 46.
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Tom Wilson, an official of the union, stated why he felt the union
negotiated clause 7(C) into the collective agreement:
...
We were being caught by men who were claiming to be in business, and it
turned out they weren't in business, they didn't have any capital, they took a
flying chance on a job and dropped out leaving us with men who didn't get their
wages and didn't get their welfare and nowhere to get any money from. On the
other hand the employers were not satisfied that we were looking after their
interest. They thought we were using one set of employers against another, in
order to improve our agreement, and this was a mutually arranged matter
in which each side would know with whom agreements were being made under
the local agreement. I do not think it was ever used to prevent anyone from
coming in, but it was used to give us a knowledge that we were dealing with
perfectly bona fide contractors.'0 6

Thus, clause 7 (C) was intended as a means of ensuring the union that it was
granting labour agreements to solvent and responsible contractors, and it was
also a means of informing mechanical contractors as to which firms were
seeking agreements with Local 46, and provided assurance that the trade union
was dealing on equal terms with all contractors.
The Commission concluded that it was certainly the right of the union
to choose the employers with whom it wished to enter into collective agreements: "If the union officials failed to facilitate Dynamic obtaining an agreement, even though it led directly to Dynamic being refused the contract, that
of itself would not infringe the Combines Investigation Act". 167 However,
clause 7(C) of the agreement was objectionable on its face because it was
capable of being used to prevent competition arising from contractors outside
the group and it was also capable of depriving labour of its legitimate right
to decide independently with what parties it would make agreements. 1 8 Since
the clause had been deleted from the new collective agreement effective April
30, 1965, the Commission did not make any order regarding it, and since no
actual collusion had occurred with respect to Dynamic, the Commission found
the charges to be unfounded.
It is interesting to note that the Commission admitted that it was not
satisfied that Clause 7(C) had caused no damage in the present case, since
it felt that the semblance of collusion had led Dynamic to the conclusion that
further attempts to get union labour from Local 46 were futile. Nevertheless,
the Commission also noted that Dynamic did not follow up two alternate
avenues open to it for getting union labour: first, to call upon the Building and
Construction Trades Council, with whom it had signed an agreement in
October, which was thus obliged to supply Dynamic with the necessary labour
in trades covered by the Council; and, second, to negotiate a national contract
with the plumbers' international union, although the Commission recognized
that this posed additional problems for Dynamic because such an agreement
would have been binding anywhere in Canada. That Dynamic failed to avail
itself or either of these opportunities may very likely be the reason why the
Commission failed to find the activity of the Joint Conference Board illegal.
106 RTPC Report No. 36 at 13-14.
107 Id. at 27.
168 Id. at 28.
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lustrated in this case is the doctrine spelled out in American cases,
'combination with a non-labour group', and perhaps even some vestiges of
the 'most favoured nation clause', since the Commission seemed to be concerned that the union might hand over part of its legitimate rights to determine
with whom it would bargain.
4.

The New Combines Investigation Act Amendments

Although the above cases show the present status of the law regarding
trade union immunity from competition legislation, and the service exemption
is not clearly defined or applied, it can be seen that Canadian judges and the
RTPC are applying some of the American tests such as the product marketlabour market distinction and combination with a non-labour group, although
they are not articulating that such tests are being used. When the new Combines Investigation Act amendments are passed, both trade union immunity
and the service exemption will be very much affected.
On June 29, 1971, the Hon. Ron Basford, Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs, introduced Bill C-256, "to promote competition, to provide
for the general regulation of trade and commerce, to promote honest and fair
dealing, to establish a Competitive Practices Tribunal, and the office of Commissioner, to repeal the Combines InvestigationAct, and to make consequential amendments to the Bank Act." It was the intention of the government not
to proceed with the passage of the legislation that session, but to invite suggestions which would then review. 69 The Bill was never debated and the
session of Parliament ended. At the next session, on November 5, 1973, the
Hon. Herb Gray, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, introduced
Bill C-227, to amend the Combines Investigation Act and related provisions
of other statutes.
Bill C-227 was also not debated, and in the next session of Parliament,
on March 11, 1974, Bill C-7 was introduced. Bill C-7 was debated, given
second reading, and referred to the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs. Bill C-7 was identical with Bill C-227, and its provisions regarding trade union immunity and the service exemption appear
to be quite different from the provisions previously found in Canadian competition legislation. Finally, a revised version of the amendments was passed
by the House of Commons, on October 16, 1975, as Bill C-2.
Bill C-2 provides that services shall be included within the scope of the
Act. This is done by new or amended definitions of "business", "merger",
"product", "service", "supply", and "trade, industry or profession", so that
all. these terms apply both to articles and services. In particular, "service" is
defined to mean "a service of any description, whether industrial, trade, professional or otherwise", and "product" is defined to include "an article and
a service". Clause 14 amends s. 32(1) of the Act by substituting the term
"product", as defined in clause 1(4), for the term "article", thus extending
the application of s. 32 (the combines section) to services.
160 Can. H. of C. Debates (June 29, 1971) at 8873-74.
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The result of Bill C-2's inclusion of services is that the courts will no
longer have to refrain from finding conspiracies in restraint of trade in service
industries, as they did before except where the combination had a direct effect
on competition in an article. In addition, persons who engage in conspiracy
with respect to the provision of labour will no longer be protected by the
service exemption, and will have to rely solely on the trade union immunity
section for relief.
Clause 2 of the Bill repeals s. 4 of the Act - the trade union immunity
section - and substitutes in its place the following:
Section 4 (1) Nothing in this Act applies in respect of
(a) Combinations or activities of workmen or employees for their
own reasonable protection as such workmen or employees;
(b) contracts, agreements or arrangements between or among
fishermen or associations of fishermen and persons or associations of persons engaged in the buying or processing of fish
relating to the prices, remuneration or other such conditions
under which fish will be caught and supplied to such persons
by fishermen;
(c) contracts, agreements or arrangements between or among two
or more employers or in a trade industry or profession
whether effected, directly between or among such employers
or through the instrumentality of a corporation or association
of which such employers are members, pertaining to collective
bargaining with their employees in respect of salary or wages
and terms or conditions of employment.
Section 4 (2) Nothing in this section exempts from the application of any
provision of this Act a contract, agreement or arrangement entered
into by an employer to withhold any product from any person,
or to refrain from acquiring from any person any product other
than the services of workmen or employees.

Section 4 (1)(a)
This subsection will re-enact the wording now found in s. 4 of the Com-

bines InvestigationAct with one minor change. In the present provision, "combinations" are exempt; in the proposed subsection, both "combinations" and
"activities" are exempt. It is difficult, however, to see how the addition of the
word "activities" will have any practical effect on the nature of the exemption.
The difficulties that are present in interpreting this standard have already
been pointed out. The Legislature has refused to clarify or set guidelines with
respect to the extent of the exemption it considers necessary to protect employee interests. However, in light of the specificity of ss. 4 (1) (b) and (c),
the court's jurisdiction to determine what is reasonable has been somewhat
narrowed since the activities listed therein are legislatively exempted.
Section 4(1)(b)
Section 4(1) (b) would replace and make permanent an exemption relating to fishermen and buyers and processors of fish in British Columbia,
which has been carried in the Combines Investigation Act, on a temporary
basis, for quite a few years as a result of an inquiry into the activities of
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fishermen and of fish packers in that province. It would also extend this
170
exemption throughout Canada.
Section 4(1)(c)
This subsection was added to the amendment of s. 4 to grant immunity
to the wide range of multi-employer bargaining techniques that are engaged71
in at the present time, and to which the application of s. 4 was unclear.'
Agreements among two or more employers in an industry are exempt insofar
as they pertain to collective bargaining with their employees in respect of
salary or wages and terms or conditions of employment. Section 4(1) (c) was
intended to be responsive to a criticism that was made of Bill C-256, which
did not include it, to the effect that the exemptions in respect of collective
bargaining were more favourable to employees than to employers.' 7 2
This sub-section appears to tie in with the use of the device of accreditation to give countervailing power to employers in construction industries where
a large number of small, independent contractors often confront one or more
of the building trades unions and the balance of power lies with the unions.
Accreditation allows employers to band together in a process much like
certification to combine their economic strength.
Crispo and Arthurs suggested, when proposing accreditation as a useful
device, that it might reinforce proclivities that already existed for the parties
to take advantage of the public and share the spoils:
As long as those spoils are represented on the one side by higher wages and on
the other by the fruits of industrial peace, the combines legislation is not offended.
However, if accreditation were adopted, it would have to be policed very carefully
173
to ensure that only these legitimate advantages were secured by the parties.

It would appear that far from policing very carefully the multi-employer
bargaining accreditation device set up through collective bargaining legislation,
Parliament is prepared to grant it immunity, subject to s. 4(2).
Section 4(2) was added to make it clear that no exemption was being
granted in respect of any agreement or arrangement on the part of an employer
to withhold or refrain from acquiring any product from anyone.' 7 4 The exemption is expressly stated. Any employer who is withholding the services of
workmen or employees, or who refrains from acquiring the services of workmen or employees, is not subject to the prohibitions of the Act. This would
appear to encompass lock-out activity on the part of employers. It would appear that s. 4(2) is a qualification on the broad scope of s. 4(1) (c), so that
170 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Proposalsfor a New Competition Policy for Canada; First Stage, Combines Investigation Act Amendments (Ottawa,
1973) at 57.

171 Id.
172

Id. at 47.

"Countervailing Employer Power: Accreditation of Contract or Associations"
in Goldenberg & Crispos, eds., Construction Labour Relations (Toronto: Canadian
Construction Assoc., 1968).
174 Supra, note 170 at 58.
173
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even if an activity "pertains" to collective bargaining, it will not be immune
if it has the effect of withholding articles or services from anyone. The extent
to which "withholding any product" will be interpreted as including the raising
of prices, lowering of quality, or slowing of technological innovation remains to
be seen. Also, it must be noted that this section only applies to employers,
and that it would appear that combinations of employees are free to agree
to withhold articles or services from anyone provided they keep within the
protections set out in the rest of the section.
Although the amendments found in Bill C-2 are intended to expand and
to set out more clearly the scope of the trade union, it would appear that the
judiciary has not been given any clearer set of legislative enactments with
which to work. They have merely been given a different set.
D.

SOLUTIONS

The new Combines Investigation Act amendments have as their objective
the promotion of competition. In its broadest sense, the promotion of competition for economic purposes arguably should include competition not only
in markets for goods and services, but also in markets for labour. Whether
socio-political purposes behind competition legislation would lead to similar
conclusions is far from settled. Arguments against the accumulation of power
by overly large unions must be set against arguments that stability, not competition, is most important in the labour market. Careful consideration would
have to be given to whether a true analogy exists between a business monopoly
and a union monopoly. An element of freedom of choice exists in a union
monopoly unlike a business monopoly, in that workers may dismantle a
monopoly by a vote to decertify or defection to raiding unions. Insofar as
workers may be the victims of a union monopoly, this distinction would appear
important, but the ultimate consumers of the product have no more ability
to dismantle a monopolistic union than a monopolistic business, and in this
sense the freedom of choice distinction is irrelevant.
During the House of Commons debate on the in-fated Competition Act,
numerous socio-political objections were raised about the collective bargaining
exemption:
We think it high 17
time
in Canada that the government applied anti-combines laws
5

to labour unions.
One concern is that the bill exempts the labour organizations from being subject
to the restraint of competition or combines legislation. Certainly, over the history
of the 19th century, and the first part of this century, the labour unions, with
the development of collective bargaining have managed to obtain for the men
a fair recognition of their labour in the development of the country. Unfortunately, however, there have developed on the labour scene conditions that are far
from market place conditions and which go a long way beyond what is normally
the proper sphere of collective bargaining.176
What does it [the bill] do in respect of the situation in177some labour unions?
They must also be considered multinational corporations.
175 Ron Atkey, Can. H. of C. Debates (March 13, 1974) at 486.
176 Don Blenkarn, id. at 521.
177

Trevor Morgan, Can. H. of C. Debates (March 29, 1974) at 1002.
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On September 20, 1973, Prime Minister Trudeau, in an interview with
Anthony Westell of The Toronto Star, said the following:
We accept that big business and big unions are monopoly type powers that can
be the cause of certain types of cost-push inflation . . . . I intend, as Prime
Minister, to counter that type of monopoly. I would include eventually the
monopoly of labour in some of the large unions. But as you will see from our
bill, as you saw from the last one, we are dealing first with the monopoly of
business because that is the more dangerous one ... having dealt with that, if we
are successful, we may also act in other laws to deal with the monopoly of

labour.
The members of Parliament quoted and the Prime Minister, then, agree
that the competition laws should be extended to cover unions, although the
Prime Minister does not feel that the time is appropriate at the present. However, none of these proposals contain any analysis of the extent of the
coverage, or whether such inclusion would be helpful in prohibiting anticompetitive union conduct, or the problems that arise because some labour
relations legislation now expressly proscribes some union activities which
were once condemned under conspiracy-in-restraint-of-trade doctrines. 73
1.

Should the Issue be left to the Courts?
In both Canada and the United States, the legislatures have been of little
aid to the courts through the years in resolving the conflicting policies found
in anti-combines and labour relations legislation. Even the Canadian Parliament's revision of the Combines Investigation Act to leave interpretation of
the collective bargaining exemption to the courts to a great extent. Legislative
intention has been expressed in the anti-combines and labour legislative enactments only to the degree that it is in the best interest of the country that
neither field be subordinated to the other.
Many of the cases discussed above demonstrate the insuperable difficulties that a court faces when it attempts to formulate general principles
governing trade union immunity from anti-combines legislation. Generalized
principles are only applicable if the extreme solutions of barring union organization along product market lines, or exempting union activities entirely from
anti-combines legislation are imposed. Decisions which attempt to reconcile
the two policies necessarily resort to arbitrary judgments based on political
realities, not on reasoned application of judicial standards. When judges are
forced to make such decisions, a principal exercise of the judicial function is
impossible. The boundaries of compromise between the two conflicting theories, therefore, must come from a clear legislative analysis of the political
realities and needs involved.
2.

Proposals:Reform to be Containedin Anti-Combines Law or in Labour
Relations Law?
The legislative solutions which have been proposed can be divided into

178 There may also be some constitutional problem in using the 'criminal law
power' in combines legislation of the Federal Parliament to regulate labour unions,
since labour relations have been held to be a matter falling within the powers of the
Legislatures: Toronto Electric Comm'ners v. Snider, 1925 A.C. 396 (P.C.). See, also,
Arthurs, supra, note 154 at 110-13.
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two categories - those which favour the application of anti-combines legislation to unions, and those which propose amendments to the labour relations
legislation to deal with the problem. Before considering these, it should be
noted that the empirical data necessary to the formulation of any comprehensive legislative solution have not been gathered. There is no reliable information on the extent or economic importance of union efforts to lessen
competition in the product market or to shelter employers from such competition. Careful factual inquiries must be undertaken before this issue can
be dealt with otherwise than in an abstract, theoretical sense.
It has been said, in the American context, that it is no exaggeration to
assert that whenever a change in the labour laws has been thought desirable,
someone has suggested widening or narrowing the applicability of the Sherman
Act to unions. 179 This tendency can be seen exhibited in the above-quoted
comments from Canadian politicians on the proposed Competition Act. However, many observers have felt that the applicability of the anti-combines
laws to labour unions would not effectively stop trade union activities that
were limiting competition in the product market.
Two commentators, James Murray 80 and James Schesinger,18s have
examined the manner in which anti-combines laws were applied to companies
in the United States and have concluded that a similar method of application
would not break up monopoly union power to any great extent. The courts
have not used anti-combines laws to break up large corporations into smaller
units, but to prevent new consolidations of power from taking place. Competition law emphasizes prosecutions based on predatory practices. Schlesinger
has called such practices "surface signs"'' 8 indicative of cut-throat pressure
and excessive competition. The monolithic monopolies have no need to engage
in predatory practices and go unscathed. How would such an approach affect
trade unions? Should anti-combines law be applied to them?
Initially, it should be noted that unions which impose the most uniform
wage patterns upon competing employers and which seem to be in the best
position to affect the amount of competition in the industry are usually found
in two environments. The first group is found in the oligopolistic industries
which display little competition in basic prices. The uniform prices in such
industries may be the cause of wage uniformity, rather than vice versa. It is
likely that the characteristics of the industry itself are what prevent competition. Allowing these oligopolistic companies to be large will of necessity result
in large unions. Allowing industry-wide pricing policies encourages industrywide bargaining by industry-wide unions.18 3 Unless the courts are included to
assume that the anti-combines laws were intended to break large corporations
into smaller units, it is difficult to see how they could interpret them this way
if applied to unions.
170 Supra, note 12 at 15.
8

1 0Supra, note 19 at 279.
181 Market Realism v. Logical Absolutes in Labor Reform (1962), 48 Va. Law
Rev. 58.
182

Id. at 73-74.
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Murray, supra, note 19 at 188.
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The second environment where one finds unions with the ability to affect
product market competition is in industries that are characterized by intense
competition. Where competition is strong, it is difficult to establish industrywide bargaining simply because of the existence of non-union firms. Unions
in such industries find it necessary to make use of methods which unions in
oligopolistic industries would find unnecessary. A good example of this is the
Pennington case.'8 The UMW, situated in a highly competitive industry where
entry was easy, was continually placed on the edge of excessive rivalry.
Whether the mine workers' market power was greater than or equal to that
of unions in the oligopolistic sectors was not examined. Instead, by concentrating on predatory practices, the anti-combines law was used to prosecute a
union which was operating in a market in which the dangers of inadequate
rivalry were lessened, "since predatory practices are but a sign that the
strength and cohesion of the inter-firm organization is not overly impressive".185 Yet the anti-combines laws leave untouched the better-hidden sources
of union power which help to make competition inadequate in a number of
industrial markets. In Schlesinger's conclusion, the present anti-combines law,
if applied to unions, would forfeit their ultimate desideratum which is the
attainment of the right balance between organization and competition. The
current interpretation of anti-combines laws, if applied to trade unions would
weaken market power where more was needed and ignore it when excessive.18 6
Murray argues that historically anti-combines laws were very effective
in limiting the growth and effectiveness of organized labour during the early
part of this century, when its main thrust was to organize the unorganized
sectors. If an historical analysis is any indication of the effects that anticombines laws would have if applied to unions today, it would seem that such
laws would be most effective in preventing new groups from being organized.
A new union among migrant workers could probably be hurt badly by the antitrust laws as once interpreted. Large, well-established and wealthy unions would
find the laws much less troublesome. This could force the unorganized workers
to rely excessively on existing unions to organize them and might tend to perpetuate and increase the power of existing unions rather than decrease it.187

Another practical problem which Murray points out is how to determine
that a union has a monopoly on labour. If the percentage of workers in an
industry were the criterion, (presuming that a definition of an 'industry'
could be agreed upon), almost all of the craft unions would probably be in
violation of the anti-combines laws because they represent 80-90 per cent of
all the craftsmen in each trade. The largest national union in the United States,
however, the Teamsters, would remain unscathed because of its diverse
membership.
One further practical problem occurs in that many activities that would
likely be prohibited if anti-combines legislation were applied to trade unions
organizational strikes, secondary boycotts, and the like - have already been
184 Supra, note 96.
185 Schlesinger, supra, note 181 at 24.
186 Id. at 74.
187 Supra, note 19 at 288.
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proscribed by the labour relations statutes. The labour relations statutes
already impose an extensive regulatory framework on collective bargaining
activities. If the anti-combines laws were added to this body of regulatory laws,
there would be a great deal of overlapping, duplication, and confusion.
As a result of these problems, both Winter 8 8 and Stephen Frank8 9 have
suggested that any additional legislation used to quell direct commercial restraint imposed by union activity should not be contained in an anti-combines
statute but in amendments to the labour relations statutes. It is not obvious
that this is an inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the above-mentioned
problems. Many of the problems discussed with respect to the anti-combines
legislation relate not only to its possible application to trade unions but also
to its present application to companies. Perhaps an examination of how to
amend the legislation to include trade unions would result in a more comprehensive and much-needed reform of the anti-combines laws as they apply
to companies, to ensure that larger units are broken up rather than sole attention being directed towards amalgamation or increased power.
However, regardless of which legislative approach is to be preferred, the
legislatures should direct their attention to the issue. There needs to be a determination of the extent to which unions are actually abusing their present
immunity status and consideration of the methods of resolving the problem
without impairing the structures of collective bargaining.
18 8 Supra, note 12.
189 The Myth of the Conflict Between Anti-Trust Law and Labor Law in the
Application of Anti-Trust Law to Union Activity (1964), 69 Dick. Law Rev. 1.

